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This paper will explore the travaux préparatoires of the legal instruments of the laws of 
war and international humanitarian law (IHL) with a view to obtaining crucial insight into 
WKHLUGUDIWHUV¶µRULJLQDO¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJVDVWRWKHLVVXHVRIWKHSURYLVLRQDOQDWXUHDQGWKH
temporal length of occupation. The findings of the travaux show that the framers of the 
µFODVVLF¶ODZVRIZDULQVWUXPHQWVDJUHHGRQWKHJHQHUDOSUHPLVHWKDWWKHOHJDOUHJLPHRI
occupation ought to be provisional. In the concurrent doctrinal discourses, this premise was 
endorsed by most scholars. The examinations of the draft records of the 1949 Geneva 
&LYLOLDQV&RQYHQWLRQUHYHDOWKDWHYHQWKHSURSRQHQWVRIµWUDQVIRUPDWLYHRFFXSDWLRQ¶GLG
not seem to envisage the occupation of the kind that would endure for decades. 
Nevertheless, by the time the 1977 Additional Protocol I was crafted, several instances of 
protracted occupation persisted. This seemed to be decisive for a shift in the argumentative 
structure. There is no gainsaying the applicability of IHL to any occupied territories, 
irrespective of the length of occupation. Yet, the suggestion that nothing under IHL would 
forestall an occupying power from engaging in a long-term occupation departs from the 
traditional premise that occupation ought to be provisional. This also seems to be 
paradoxical in historical perspectives.  
 
 
1. Introduction - How Prolonged Occupation Has been Accounted for 
Throughout the historical upheavals of warfare and occupation, legal experts and state 
practice have had to grapple with the entangled question of how to rationalize a relatively 
lengthy pattern of occupation.1 Since the adoption of the Geneva Conventions (GCs) of 
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1949,2 WKHIDFWXDOµSKHQRPHQRQ¶ 3 of the so-FDOOHGµSURORQJHGRFFXSDWLRQ¶4 can be seen in 
several places. The primary purpose of this paper is to explore how the drafters of the 
documents of the laws of war and of international humanitarian law (IHL) comprehended 
the question of temporal length of occupation and how this question has been addressed in 
the trajectory of doctrinal discourses. 6SHFLDO IRFXV ZLOO EH SODFHG RQ WKH µRULJLQDO¶
intention of the traditional laws of war such as the Brussels Declaration (1874) and the 
Hague Regulations (1899/1907), as these have provided the fundamental basis for the legal 
regime of belligerent occupation.  
 
The paper will start with tracing the historical evolution of the legal concept of occupation 
and evaluating the nature of the legal regime of occupation that has crystallized since the 
second half of the nineteenth century. After providing brief rationales for having recourse 
to the travaux préparatoires, in-depth examinations will turn to the relevant legal 
documents. ,QWKHµIRUPDWLYHSHULRG¶RIWKHODZVRIZDU-1949), the normative matrix 
on the law of belligerent occupation was initiated by the Lieber Code (1863), and nurtured 
by the Brussels Declaration (1874), the Oxford Manual (1880) and the Hague Regulations 
(1899/1907). Investigations into the preparatory works of the relevant legal instruments 
will help better grasp the GUDIWHUV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIERWKWKHOHJDOQDWXUHRIDQRFFXS\LQJ
SRZHU¶VDXWKRULW\DQGWKHEDVLFLGHDVRUµSULQFLSOHV¶JRYHUQLQJits extraordinary authority 
under those instruments. This assists in ascertaining if the drafters of those instruments 
contemplated a lengthy drawn-out occupation within the normative structure. In the 
subsequent sections, the findings of the underlying assumptions of those classic documents 
will be compared to the modern practice and doctrines of IHL that have unfolded since the 
adoption of the GCs (1949). Detailed queries will be made into the preparatory work of the 
GCIV and API. These will be followed by succinct evaluations of the modern doctrinal 
discourses, which seem to depart from the classic premise of the law of war that stressed 
the temporary nature of occupation. In the final section, this paper will briefly engage in 
critical examinations of the argumentative structure(s) surrounding the protracted form of 
occupation in the light of the historical and political context.  
  
Identifying the background condition(s) of the issue to be explored and demarcating the 
parameters of their implications are essential for any analytical investigations in the 
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 The decades-long instances of occupation include (but are not limited to):  the Palestinian territories 
occupied by neighbouring states at different temporal phases since 1948 (the Gaza Strip by Egypt between 
1959-1967; the large segments of the West Bank by Jordan between 1948-1967; the Gaza Strip by Israel 
between 1967-2005 or until now; and the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights by Israel since 
1967); Tibet by China since 1950; Northern Cyprus by Turkey since 1974; the Western Sahara under gradual 
Moroccan occupation since 1975; East Timor occupied by Indonesia between 1975-1999. 
3
 )RUDVXJJHVWLRQIRUDQHPHUJLQJFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIµRFFXSDWLRQDVDQRUPDWLYHSKHQRPHQRQ¶VHH<DsO 
5RQHQµ$&HQWXU\RIWKH/DZRI2FFXSDWLRQ¶Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 169 at 
184-185; and Aeyal Gross, The Writing on the Wall ± Rethinking the International Law of Occupation, 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2017), at 2-4, 6 et seq. 
4
 See Adam Roberts, µ3URORQJHG0LOLWDU\2FFXSDWLRQWKH,VUDHOL-2FFXSLHG7HUULWRULHV6LQFH¶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




disciplines of social science. After all, the law as social construcWLVµDFXOWXUDOPHGLXPRI
H[SUHVVLYHIRUP¶5 which ought to be grasped as profoundly rooted in a particular context 
of time and space.6 :LWKUHVSHFWWRODZVRIZDUDVQRWHGE\0pJUHWµWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\
laws of war, as the culmination of centuries of European thought expressed in the language 
of nineteenth-century positivism, are necessarily a by-product of the specific conditions 
WKDWJDYHULVHWRWKHP¶7  
 
2. The Historical Evolution of the Law of Belligerent Occupation  
2.1. From the 1RWLRQµ6XEVWLWXWHGSovereignty¶WRD5XGLPHQWDU\/HJDOConcept of 
Occupation 
The factual phenomenon of invasion, conquest and temporary military occupation was 
observable in different parts of the world for centuries throughout the human history 
whenever dominant or rivalling states vied for territorial aggrandizement. Yet, as will be 
explained below, it was not until after the Napoleonic War that the legal regime of 
belligerent occupation with its distinct rights and obligations of the occupying power came 
to be conceived. In the opinion of Hall, one of the leading late-nineteenth century scholars 
of international law, what was prevalent in the practice of the European warfare until the 
Seven Years War (1763) ZDVWKHGRFWULQHRIµVXEVWLWXWHGsovereignty.8 According to this 
doctrine, invaders were considered to replace the local sovereignty of the invaded territory 
and to assume the full sovereign power during the invasion phase.9 Hall argued that this 
doctrine fell into desuetude only after mid-eighteenth century.10  
                                                 
 
5
 Desmond Manderson, Songs Without Words ± Aesthetic Dimension of Law and Justice, (Berkeley:  Univ. 
of California Press, 2000), at 201. 
6
 Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence ± The Political Philosophy of Justice, (Oxford:  
Hart, 2005), at 248. 
7
 )UpGpULF 0pJUHW µ)URP ³6DYDJHV´ WR ³8QODZIXO &RPEDWDQWV´  D 3RVWFRORQLDO /RRN DW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Humanitarian /DZ¶V ³2WKHU´¶ LQ $QQH 2UIRUG HG International Law and Its Others, (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 265-317, at 304. 
8
 William Edward Hall, Treatise on International Law, (3rd ed., 1890) at 463-464, 466, 469, para. 154. 
9
 For instance, the invader was authorized to demand impressment (forcing an oath of allegiance of the 
occupied populations, and the handing over of the territory even while questions of hostilities remained 
XQGHFLGHGDVLIWKH\KDGEHHQWKHLQYDGHU¶VVXEMHFWVDQGWHUULWory:  ibid., at 463-464, para. 154. See also ibid., 
416, para. 136; 7KRPDV%DW\µ7KH5HODWLRQVRI,QYDGHUVWR,QVXUJHQWV¶-27) 36 Yale Law Journal 966, 
at 966-967, 972-973. See also /DULVVD2SSHQKHLPµ7KH/HJDO5HODWLRQV%HWZHHQDQ2FFXS\LQJ3RZHUand 
WKH,QKDELWDQWV¶Law Quarterly Review DWH[SODLQLQJWKDWµWKHRFFXSDQWLVIRUWKHWLPH
EHLQJ WKHVRYHUHLJQRI WKHRFFXSLHG WHUULWRU\¶ZKLOH WUHDWLQJ WKLVGRFWULQHDVXQWHQDEOHDW WKH WLPHRIKLV
writing). 
10
 Hall explained that: 
 
$IWHUWKHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKH6HYHQ<HDUV¶:DUWKHVHYLROHQWXVDJHVVHHPWRKDYHIDOOHQLQWRGHVXHWXGHDQG
at the same time indications appear in the writings of jurists which show that a sense of the difference 
between the rights consequent upon occupation and upon conquest was beginning to be felt.  
 
Hall, supra n. 8, at 463, para. 153, footnote omitted. Baty challenged this historical timeline. He argued that 
DQ\WKHRU\RIµVXEVWLWXWHGVRYHUHLJQW\¶KDGEHHQGHIXQFWDVHDUO\DVWKHHQGRIWKHPHGLHYDOSHUiod in Europe. 
In his view, since then, an invading power, when assuming the full sovereign power of the territories that it 





$VVWDWHGE\9HU]LMO¶VKLVWRULFDOVXUYH\LWVHHPVWKDWDUXGLPHQWDU\fragment of the law of 
occupation DORQJVLGHDTXDOLILHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHµVXEVWLWXWHGVRYHUHLJQW\¶appeared 
after the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). The effective occupation of territory was comprehended 
DVµRSHUDWLQJDFKDQJHRIVRYHUHLJQW\XQGHUWKHFRQGLWLRQVXVSHQVLYH«of a peace treaty 
ZLWK UHWURDFWLYH HIIHFW¶11  /DWHU SXEOLVKLQJ GXULQJ WKH 6HYHQ <HDUV¶ :DU LQ WKH PLG-
eighteenth century, Vattel was instrumental in recognising the legal effect of occupation as 
being that of a provisional state of affairs, which was to be distinguished from conquest.12 
There was an understanding WKDW WKHQDWXUHRI WKHRFFXS\LQJSRZHUZDV WXUQHG LQWR µD
quasi-VRYHUHLJQW\¶13 RUDµWUXVWHH¶.14 AccoUGLQJWR+DOOµthe invader was invested with a 
quasi-sovereignty, which gave him a claim as of right to the obedience of the conquered 
population, and the exercise of which was limited only by the qualifications, which 
JUDGXDOO\ EHFDPH HVWDEOLVKHG¶ Hall DGGHG WKDW WKH LQYDGHU µPXVW QRW DV D JHQHUDO UXOH
modify the permanent institutions of the country, and that he must not levy recruits for his 
DUP\¶15 In terms of special importance attached to the rights of private property of civilians 
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 Jan Hendrik Willem Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective ± Part IX A, The Laws of War 
(A.W. Sijhoff, 1978), at 151 (emphasis in original). 
12
 Vattel observed that: 
 
/HVLPPHXEOHV OHVWHUUHV OHVYLOOHV OHVSURYLQFHVSDVVHQWVRXVODSXLVVDQFHGHO¶HQQHPLTXLV¶HPSDUH
PDLVO¶DFTXLVLWLRQQHVHFRQVRPPH la propriété ne devient stable et parfait que par le traité de paix, ou par 
O¶HQWLqUHVRXPLVVLRQHWO¶H[WLQFWLRQGHO¶ƜWDWDXTXHOFHVYLOOHVHWSURYLQFHVDSSDUWHQDLHQW«8QWLHUVQH
peut donc acquérir avec sûreté une place ou une province conquise, juVTX¶jFHTXH OH VRXYHUDLQTXL OD
perdue y ait renoncé par le traité de paix, ou que, soumis sans retour, il ait perdu sa souverainté. 
,PPRYDEOHSRVVHVVLRQVODQGVWRZQVSURYLQFHV«EHFRPHWKHSURSHUW\RIWKHHQHP\ZKRPDNHVKLPVHOI
master of them: but it is only by the treaty of peace, or the entire submission and extinction of the state to 
which those towns and provinces belonged, that the acquisition is completed, and the property becomes 
VWDEOHDQGSHUIHFW«DWKLUGSDUW\FDQQRWVDIHO\SXUFKDVHDFRQquered town or province, till the sovereign 
from whom it was taken has renounced it by a treaty of peace, or has been irretrievably subdued, and has 
lost his sovereignty.) 
 
Emer de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens ou Principe de la Loi Naturelle Appliqués à la Conduite et aux Affaires 
et des Nations et des Souverains, (London, 1758), Livre III, Chapter XIII, paras 197-198; idem, The Law of 
Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature, as Applied to the Conduct of Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns 
(translated by Joseph Chitty, Philadelphia:  Johnson, 1844), at 455. 
13
 +DOOUHIHUUHGWRWKHQDWXUHRIEHOOLJHUHQWRFFXSDWLRQXQGHUWKHV\VWHPRIµTXDVL-VRYHUHLJQW\¶DVµWKHGRFWULQH
RIWHPSRUDU\DQGSDUWLDOVXEVWLWXWLRQRIVRYHUHLJQW\¶+DOOsupra n. 8, at 464. 
14
 Baty, supra n. 9 at 973. For the modern proposal for a belligerent occupation as a trustee see Allan Gerson, 
µ7UXVWHH2FFXSDQW7KH/HJDO6WDWXVRI,VUDHO¶V3UHVHQFHLQWKH:HVW%DQN¶Harvard International 
Law Journal 1-49. See also Orna Ben-1DIWDOLµPathoLAWgical Occupation:  Normalizing the Exceptional 
&DVH RI WKH 2FFXSLHG 3DOHVWLQLDQ 7HUULWRU\ DQG 2WKHU /HJDO 3DWKRORJLHV¶ LQ 2UQD %HQ-Naftali (ed), 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 





While the continuing sovereignty of the original owner became generally recognised for certain purposes, 




under occupation, the notion RI µTXDVL-sovereignW\¶ had similarity to the concept of 
occupation that has crystallized in the legal instruments in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.16 What made the doctrine of substituted sovereignty distinguishable from the 
modern concept of occupation is that the former admitted of considerably extensive powers 
of the kind reserved to sovereign states.17 Nonetheless, even according to this doctrine, it 
ZDVQHYHUHQYLVDJHGWKDWWKHRFFXS\LQJSRZHUDVDµTXDVL-VRYHUHLJQ¶ZRXOGbe invested 
with the power to transform the national character of the territory and population. 18  
According to Hall19 and Oppenheim,20 WKHUHVLGXDODQGµUHPRWH LQIOXHQFH¶ of the earlier 
doctrine of substituted sovereignty persisted until the mid-nineteenth century, and on the 
fringe of publicists, even until the late nineteenth century. 21  Writing in 1858, Georg 
Friedrich von Martens (1858) explained WKDWWKHµFRQTXHURU¶µYDLQTXHXU¶) can substitute 
itself with the vanquished government and exercise the sovereign power until the peace 
treaty.22 
 
2.2. Emergence of Belligerent Occupation as a Distinct Legal Concept 
It is suggested that the emergence of belligerent occupation as a distinct legal concept 
wholly set apart from the right of conquest (and from the doctrine of substituted 
                                                 
 
character of the soil and its inhabitants remained unaltered; but the invader was invested with a quasi-
sovereignty, which gave him a claim as of right to the obedience of the conquered population, and the 
exercise of which was limited only by the qualifications, which gradually became established, that he must 
not as a general rule modify the permanent institutions of the country, and that he must not levy recruits for 
his army. 
 
Hall, supra n. 8, at 464-465, para. 154. 
16
 Georg Friedrich von Martens, Prpcis du droit des gens moderne de l'Europe (1858), at 254-255, para. 280 
(referring to the restrictions on private property only in case where thLVZDVµLPSpULHXVHPHQWSUpVFULSWSDU
OHVQpFHVVLWpVGHODOXWWH¶6HHDOVR-RKDQ/XGZLJ.OEHUDroit des gens moderne de l'Europe (1831), Vol. 
II, at 40 and 42, para. 255-256. 
17
 Baty, supra n. 9. 
18
 Ibid, at 973. 
19
 Hall, supra n. 8, at 468, para. 154, at 466-468. He refers to Klüber, supra n. 16, Vol. II, at 42, para. 256 as 
indicating an example of the residual influence of the doctrine of substituted sovereignty doctrine. Yet, as 
will be explained in n. 26 below, this is a flawed reading of his work. 
20
 Oppenheim (1917), supra n. 9, at 6, at 363. 
21
 This was especially the case when examining the nature of the relation between the inhabitants and the 
occupying power. For instance, even some prominent scholars in the mid-nineteenth century continued to 
espouse the notion that the duty of obedience could be imposed on the inhabitants under occupation. Further, 
it should be noted that irrespective of whether or not based on such notion of substituted sovereignty, it is 
VXJJHVWHG WKDW /LHEHU¶V FRQFHSW RI RFFXSDtion embodied a rejection of the then emerging theories that 
maintained a quasi-contractual relationship between the occupant and the inhabitants, which exchanged 
temporary obedience for protection:  5RWHP*LODGLµ$'LIIHUHQW6HQVHRI+XPDQLW\± Occupation in Frances 
/LHEHU¶V&RGH¶,55&at 114. 
22
 Von Martens (1858), supra n. 16, at 254-255, para. 280. Note, however, his caveat that occupation does 
not entail taking possession of the public and private property of the occupied. See also Travers Twiss, The 
Law of Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities, Vol. II, Para. 64, (Oxford University 
3UHVVDUJXLQJWKDWµLIDEHOOLJHUHQW1DWLRQWDNHVSRVVHVVLRQRIDQ(QHP\¶VWHUULWRU\LWWDNHVSRVVHVVLRQ





sovereignty) was most marked in the wake of the Napoleonic War. 23  The post-war 
settlement raised various problems, including the need to distinguish between temporary 
and permanent conquest,24 the (in)ability of temporary conquerors to acquire title to assets 
of the occupied or conquered territories, as well as the question of how to reconcile those 
economic and financial transactions with the post-war problems of the jus postliminii.25 By 
the mid-nineteenth century, the law of belligerent occupation, as a distinct legal category 
(as part of the laws of war), has taken its embryonic shape and started to grow in gestation.26 
As claimed by Korman, the notion of occupatio bellica came to develop as a legal category 
separate from the idea of debellatio.27 In this context, an occupying power was grasped as 
a non-sovereign, temporary holder of power equipped with specific rights and 
                                                 
 
23
 Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest:  The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law 
2[IRUG  &ODUHQGRQ  DW  UHIHUULQJ WR WKH UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ µEHOOLJHUHQW
RFFXSDWLRQ¶WKDWUHIHUUHGWRWKHFRQGLWLRQVKRUWRIVRYHUHLJQW\DQGµVXEMXJDWLRQ¶3HWHU056WLUN+LVWRU\
of Military Occupation from 1792 to 1914, (Edinburgh University Press, 2016). Note that during the 
Napoleonic War, the British occupied Egypt under the rule of Ottoman Turkey, demanding allegiance of the 
local inhabitants:  Baty, supra n. 9, at 973. 
24
 Conquest is defined as acquiring enemy territory by military means with intention of enlarging national 
territory:  5RWHP*LODGLµ7KHJus Ad Bellum/Jus In Bello 'LVWLQFWLRQDQGWKH/DZRI2FFXSDWLRQ¶
41(1/2) Israel Law Review 246, at 273. This shoXOG EH GLVWLQJXLVKHG IURP PLOLWDU\ RFFXSDWLRQ µD \HW
XQGHFLGHGSKDVHRIZDU¶1LLVXNH$QGRSurrender, Occupation and Private Property in International Law 
35 (Oxford:  Clarendon, 1991). 
25
 Ernst H. Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of Belligerent Occupation, (Washington D.C.:  
Carnegie Endowment, 1942), at 10-11, paras 40-42. Jus postliminii refers to the restoration of the legal status 
quo ante following the end of occupation or of hostilities:  P. Fauchille, Traité de droit international public, 
tome II, (1921), at 1058±59; and G. Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts 
and Tribunals, Vol. II: The Law of Armed Conflict (1968), at 199, 204, 338 and 346. 
26
 See Klüber, supra n. 16, Vol. II, at 40 and 42, paras 255-256. His work showed a transition from the earlier 
doctrine of substituted sovereignty to the one akin to the modern legal notion of occupation as we understand 
WRGD\+HDUJXHGWKDWZKLOHWKHFRQTXHURUWDNHVSODFHRIWKHGLVSODFHGJRYHUQPHQWLQH[HUFLVLQJµsovereign 
ULJKWV¶ WKLV ZRXOG QHYHU JLYH WKH IDFW RI FRQTXHVW WKH ULJKW RI DWWULEXWLQJ VRYHUHLJQW\ RI WKH FRXQWU\
concerned. See also Lassa Francis Oppenheim, International Law ± A Treatise, Vol. II (War and Neutrality), 
2nd ed., at 211, para. 169 (London: Longmans/Green, 1912) (arguing that µDOWKRXJKDVUHJDUGVWKHVDIHW\RI
his army and the purpose of war the occupant is vested with an almost absolute power, he is not the Sovereign 
of the territory, and therefore has no right to make changes in the laws or in the administration except those 
which are temporarily necessitated by his interest in the maintenance and safety of his army and the 
UHDOLVDWLRQRIWKHSXUSRVHRIZDU¶ 
27







obligations.28 According to Loening29 and Hersch Lauterpacht,30 in the academic discourse, 
it was August Wilhelm Heffter that pioneered in developing the legal doctrine of 
µEHOOLJHUHQWRFFXSDWLRQ¶ as marked off from the notion of conquest.31 In his treatise of 1844, 
Heffter already set forth the basic principles of the law of belligerent occupation. He 
observed that, except in the case of debellatio, the legal concept of occupation was merely 
the form of temporary control that suspended the exercise of sovereign rights of the 
occupied state. In his view, this would not result in the transfer of sovereignty.32  
 
The foundational ideas of the law of belligerent occupation as developed later on reflected 
the legal consciousness of European legal advisors in the mid-nineteenth century. It is 
suggested that Francis Lieber tried to obtain some insight from the practice of European 
states during, and in the aftermath of, µPRGHUQ(XURSHDQZDUV¶QDPHO\WKH1DSROHRQLF
wars) when preparing the military manual for the American Civil War (1861-65).33 The 
Lieber Code (1863), which is the earliest positivised text that enunciated the law of 






(1872) 4 Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparé 622 at 627-628 (referring to three basic 
principles on belligerent occupation that Heffter summarizHG   µO
RFFXSDWLRQ G
XQ SD\V SDU O
HQQHPL
SHQGDQW OD GXUpH GH OD JXHUUH FRQVWLWXH XQ UDSSRUW HQWLqUHPHQW GLIIpUHQW GH OD FRQTXrWH GX SD\V¶ µWKH
occupation of a country by the enemy during the period of the war constitutes a relation entirely different 




DQWpULHXU HVW VXVSHQGX¶ µGXULQJ WKH RFFXSDWLon of a territory by the enemy the previous government is 
VXVSHQGHG¶µPDLVOHJRXYHUQHPHQWDQWpULHXUQ
HVWTXHVXVSHQGXHWVHVSRXYRLUVQHSDVVHQWSDVGDQV
WRXWH OHXU pWHQGXH j O
HQQHPL HQYDKLVVDQW OHTXHO Q
HVW SDV LQYHVWL GH OD VRXYHUDLQHWp¶ µEXW the previous 
government is only suspended, and its powers do not pass in all their extent to the invading enemy, which is 
QRWLQYHVWHGZLWKWKHVRYHUHLJQW\¶WUDQVODWLRQE\WKHSUHVHQWDXWKRUSee also D. August Wilhelm Heffter, 
Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart, (Berlin:  E.H. Schroeder, 1844). 
30
 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. 2: War, Peace and Neutrality, ed. Hersch 
Lauterpacht, 5th edition, (London:  Longmans, 1935), at 344. 
31
 6HHDOVR(\DO%HQYHQLVWLµ7KH2ULJLQVRIWKH&RQFHSWRI%HOOLJHUHQW2FFXSDWLRQ¶Law and 
History Review 621 at 630-632. Nevertheless, Heffter did not fully recognize another special principle of 
belligerent occupation, namely, the requirement of minimum interference with local laws:  ibid., at 631. 
32
 +HIIWHUVWDWHGWKDWµ[o]nly if complete defeat of a state authority (debellatio) has been reached and rendered 
this state authority unable to make any further resistance, can the victorious side also take over the state 
authority, and begin its own, albeit usurpatory, state relationship with the defeated people....Until that time, 
WKHUHFDQEHRQO\DIDFWXDOFRQ¿VFDWLRQRIWKHULJKWVDQGSURSHUW\RIWKHSUHYLRXVVWDWHDXWKRULW\ZKLFKLV
VXVSHQGHGLQWKHPHDQWLPH¶+HIIWHUsupra n. 29, para. 131 (translation by the present author). The original 
WH[WUHDGVµ(UVWZHQQHLQHYROOVWlQGLJH%HVLHJXQJGHUEHNULHJWHQ6WDDWVJHZDOWdebellatio) eingetreten und 
dieselbe zu fernerem Widerstande unfähig gemacht ist, kann sich der siegreiche Theil auch der Staatsgewalt 
bemächtigen, und nun ein eigenes, wiewohl usurpatorisches, Staatsverhältniß mit dem besiegten Volke 
beginnen....Bis dahin ¿ndet lediglich eine thatsächliche Beschlagnahme der Rechte und des Vermögens der 
inzwischen suspendirten bisherigen StDDWVJHZDOW6WDWW¶DOOFODVVLFVSHOOLQJVLQWKHRULJLQDO6HHDOVR ibid., 
para. 185; Halleck, supra n. 27, at 777 and 781, paras 2 and 5 (dicussing the doctrines among European 
ZULWHUVZKRKLJKOLJKWHGµWHPSRUDU\¶FKDUDFWHURIPLOLWDU\RFFXSDWLRQ$VZLOOEHGLVFXVVHGODWHU+DOOHFN
VWUHVVHVµDGLIIHUHQWUXOH¶IROORZHGE\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVSUDFWLFHibid., at 784-787, paras 8-9.  
33




belligerent occupation,34 SURFODLPV WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI µPDUWLDO ODZ¶ LQ WKH DUHD XQGHU
occupation. Furthermore, the drafters of the Brussels Declaration (1874), which provided 
the prototype for the subsequent treaties on the laws of war, drew out much of normative 
dividends from the Lieber Code.35 
 
While the Lieber Code assumes the state of occupation as a matter of factual control when 
determining the applicability of martial law, it fails to define what is meant by occupation.36 
This was done in the subsequent Brussels Declaration (1874). The first paragraph of Article 
1 of this Declaration VWLSXODWHVWKDWµ>W@HUULWRU\is considered occupied when it is actually 
SODFHGXQGHU WKHDXWKRULW\RI WKHKRVWLOHDUP\¶7KHVHFRQGSDUDJUDSKRI WKLVSURYLVLRQ
SURFODLPVWKDWµ>W@KHRFFXSDWLRQH[WHQGVRQO\WRWKHWHUULWRU\ZKHUHVXFKDXWKRULW\KDVEHHQ
established and can be exercised¶37 Subsequently, such a two-tier structure of defining the 
FRQFHSWRIµRFFXSDWLRQ¶ LV LQFRUSRUDWHGLQWR$UWLFOH+DJXH5HJXODWLRQV. 
This positivised rule, one of the achievements of codifying the laws of war in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, has proven to be remarkably resilient over the vicissitudes 
of war and occupation. It maintains enduring relevance to present-day cases of occupation.  
 
3. The Nature of Occupation 8QGHUVWRRGLQWKHµ&ODVVLF¶'RFWULQHV 
It is of special importance to summarize the distinct features of the legal regime of 
belligerent occupation38 which have come to be recognized in the doctrines of the laws of 
war since the second half of the nineteenth century. The role and scope of the exceptional 
powers granted to the occupier are considered a simulative exercise of state sovereign 
                                                 
 
34
 Giladi (2012), supra n. 21, at 82 and 87. While the ideas on occupation were derived from the European 
practice and doctrine, the Lieber Code was considered novel as presenting a basis of a treaty:  Benvenisti, 
(2008), supra n. 31, at 640-641. 
35
 It ought to be noted that this system of law duly mirrored and fed the then prevalent social and political 
FRQVFLRXVQHVVRIµFLYLOLzHG¶QDWLRQVLQ1RUWK$PHULFDDQG(XURSHLQFOXGLQJWKHSULPRUGLDOLPSRUWDQFHRf 
private property based on the idea of laissez-faire economy. See, for instance, Hall, supra n. 8, at 470, para. 
155. 
36
 Article 1(1) of the Lieber Code proclaims that µ>D@SODFHGLVWULFWRUFRXQWU\RFFXSLHGE\DQHQHP\VWDQGV
in consequence of the occupation, under the Martial Law of the invading or occupying army, whether any 
SURFODPDWLRQGHFODULQJ0DUWLDO/DZRUDQ\SXEOLFZDUQLQJWRWKHLQKDELWDQWVKDVEHHQLVVXHGRUQRW¶ 
37
 Translation into English by ICRC. Article 1 in the authentic French text rHDGV WKDW µ8Q WHUULWRLUH HVW






 Apart from belligerent occupation (occupatio bellica), it is possible to contemplate two more genres of 
occupation:  occupatio mixta - bellica pacifica, or mixed occupation, which refers to the state of occupation 
that can come into existence between an armistice and the conclusion of a treaty of peace among the 
belligerents; and occupatio pacifica, which addresses the case of military occupation of foreign territory in 
time of peace, which is based on consent, or at least acquiescence, of the territorial state:  F. Llewellyn Jones, 
µ0LOLWDU\2FFXSDWLRQRI$OLHQ7HUULWRU\LQ7LPHRI3HDFH¶Transactions Grotius Soc'y 133 at 149-
150. Those two other forms of occupation are supposed to share with belligerent occupation the two-tier 
assumptions: that there is supposed to be no surrender or transfer of sovereignty; and that occupation should 
be an µHVVHQWLDOO\SURYLVLRQDO¶ state of affairs:  ibid, at 159. For pacific occupation, see also Yoram Dinstein, 
µ7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO6WDWXVRIWKH:HVW%DQNDQGWKH*D]D6WULS± 1998¶Israel Yearbook on 




authority, which takes place during a temporary intermission of the normal stabilized order 
of relations among the sovereign states. Accordingly, the nature of belligerent occupation 
is most aptly characterized as D µVRYHUHLJQ VXVSHQVLRQ¶.39  At the Brussels Conference 
(1874), such an idea was favoured over the perspective that viewed occupation as 
analogous to the state of blockade suggested by some delegates.40  
 
The most axiomatic legal principle of belligerent occupation that came to be widely 
recognized by the Brussels Conference (1864) is that the occupying power does not gain 
sovereignty over the occupied territory. 41  The sovereignty in juridical sense remains 
always vested in the occupied state (or people). Writing in the aftermath of the Franco-
Prussian War (1870), Loening rejected the notion of transfer of sovereignty. He stated that :   
 
As regards the power of the enemy that occupies the territory, we are today in agreement 
to recognize that it does not replace the power of the vanquished state. As the occupied 
territory is not yet separated from the state to which it appertains, and the inhabitants 
UHPDLQFLWL]HQVRIWKDWFRXQWU\WKHUHLVQRFKDQJHLQWKHVRYHUHLJQW\¶42 
 
0RVW ZULWHUV VLQFH WKH +DJXH 5HJXODWLRQV PDGH FOHDU WKDW µWKH VRYHUHLJQW\ RI WKH ROG
government remains in legal existencHHYHQWKRXJKLWFDQQRWEHH[HUFLVHG¶43 Along this 
line, the United States military manual of 1914 stated that:   
                                                 
 
39
 Orna Ben-1DIWDOL $H\DO 0 *URVV DQG .HUHQ 0LFKDHOL µ,OOHJDO 2FFXSDWLRQ  )UDPLQJ WKH 2FFXSLHG
3DOHVWLQLDQ7HUULWRU\¶Berkeley Journal of International Law 551, at 562 and 592. See also ibid., 
DW7KHFRLQDJHµVRYHUHLJQVXVSHQVLRQ¶LVDJRRGVXPPDWLRQRIZKDWWKHFODVVLFDXWKRUVKDYHDUJXHG
since the second half of the nineteenth century. See, for instance, Charles M. Calvo, Le Droit International 
Théorique et Pratique, 4th ed., (Paris:  Guillaumin et Cie, 1888), Tome Quatrième, at 212, para. 2166.  
40
 0LQLVWqUH GHV $IIDLUHV ƜWUDQJqUHV Documents Diplomatiques - Actes de la Conférence de Bruxelles, 
(Brussels:  F. Hayez, 1874), at 106 (Colonel fédéral Hammer of Switzerland proposing the application, by 
analogy, of the law on blockade to situations of occupation). See also Calvo, ibid., at 213, para. 2168 
(favourably commenting on this proposal). 
41
 Calvo, ibid., at 212, para. µ4XDQWDXSRXYRLUGHO¶HQQHPLTXLRFFXSHOHWHUritoire, il est bien entendu 
TX¶LOQHUHPSODFHSDVFHOXLGHO¶ƜWDWYDLQFXOHTXHOQ¶HVWTXHVXVSHQGXHWQHVDXUDLWSDVVHUGDQVWRXWHVRQ
pWHQGXHjO¶HQYDKLVVHXUTXLQ¶HVWQXOOHPHQWLQYHVWLGHODVRXYHUDLQHWp«LOQ¶\DGRQFSDVFKDQJHPHQWGH
souveraineWp¶µ5HJDUGLQJWKHSRZHURIWKHHQHP\WKDWoccupies the territory, it is well understood that it 
does not replace the power of the vanquished state, which is only suspended and cannot pass in all its extent 
to the invader, which is never invested with thH VRYHUHLJQW\«WKHUH LV KHQFHQR FKDQJH LQ VRYHUHLJQW\¶
English translation by the present author); Oppenheim (1917), supra n. 9, at 363-µ«WKURXJKPLOLWDU\
occupation the authority over the territory and the inhabitants only de facto, and not by right, and only 
WHPSRUDULO\DQGQRWSHUPDQHQWO\SDVVHVLQWRWKHKDQGVRIWKHRFFXSDQW¶ Hall, supra n. 8, at 469, para. 154. 
42





DFFRUGSRXU reconnaître qu'il 
ne remplace pas celui de l'État vaincu. Le territoire occupé n'est pas encore séparé de l'État auquel il 
appartenait, les habitants sont demeurés citoyens de celui-FLLOQ
\SDVHXFKDQJHPHQWGHVRXYHUDLQHWp¶ 
 
Loening, supra n. 29, at 651-652; translation by the present author. 
43
 Doris Appel Graber, The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation 1863-1914, (New York:  





Being an incident of war, military occupation confers upon the invading force the right 
to exercise control for the period of occupation. It does not transfer the sovereignty to the 
occupant, but simply the authority or power to exercise some of the rights of 
sovereignty¶44  
 
It can hence be suggested that the nature of occupation is most aptly characterised as a 
µVXVSHQGHGVRYHUHLJQ¶ 
 
As a corollary of no transfer of sovereignty, WKHGRFWULQHVLQWKHµIRUPDWLYHSHULRG¶RIWKH
laws of war (1863-1949) came to suggest that the public authority exercised by an 
occupying power over the occupied territory and population ought to be provisional or 
µWUDQVLHQW¶ DQG QHYHU SHUPDQHQW 45  7KH RFFXS\LQJ SRZHU¶V H[HUFLVH RI JRYHUQPHQWDO
power was confined temporally to the period until the role of the territorial administration 
was handed over to the legitimate sovereign.46 According to the doctrines of µFODVVLF¶
writers, occupation gave an invading power only a temporary (and non-permanent) status 
                                                 
 
44
 United States War Department, Rules of Land Warfare, (1914), p. 105, para. 287, emphasis added. 
45
 Hall, supra n. 8, at 470, para. 155; Oppenheim (1917), supra n. 9, at 363-µWKURXJKPLOLWDU\RFFXSDWLRQ
the authority over the territory and the inhabitants only de facto, and not by right, and only temporarily, and 
not SHUPDQHQWO\SDVVHVLQWRWKHKDQGVRIWKHRFFXSDQW¶ 
46
 To support this in the classic text, see Calvo, supra n. 39, at 212, para. µHOOH>O¶RFFXSDWLRQ@VXEVLVWH





or disappears at the conclusion of SHDFH«WKHRFFXSLHGWHUULWRU\LVRQO\WUDQVLWLRQDOO\VXEMHFWWRWKHSRZHU
of the enemy, which establishes therein the martial law, that is, the temporary administration having as a 





of factual nature. 47  Such a provisional nature was considered a special hallmark of 
occupation that marked a contrast to the notion of conquest.48  
 
Writing during WoUOG:DU,,)HLOFKHQIHOGDYHUUHGWKDWµ[t]KHDSSOLFDWLRQRI«UHJXODWRU\
SRZHUV>RIWKHRFFXSDQW@H[WHQGVRYHUSUDFWLFDOO\DOOILHOGVRIOLIH«if an occupation lasts 
IRUDQ\OHQJWKRIWLPH¶.49 This might be read as implying the possibility of long-running 
occupation that was hardly considered temporary. However, what Feilchenfeld contended 
was that the length of occupation depended on the duration of warfare in which both armies 
were still fighting.50 Hence, this contention was based on the idea that occupation was 
limited to the period of hostilities.51 Feilchenfeld took pains to emphasize repeatedly the 
precarious nature of belligerent occupation.52 +HVWDWHGWKDWµ[t]he special rules applied to 
EHOOLJHUHQWRFFXSDWLRQRIDQHQHP\VWDWHGXULQJDZDU«VHWXSDspecial system under which 
the territorial changes of belligerent occupation, even if likely to be permanent, is treated 
DVSUHFDULRXVDVORQJDVWKHZDUFRQWLQXHV¶53  
                                                 
 
47
 Writing prior to the Brussels Declaration (in 1872), Loening made clear that: 
 
The occupation is a simple fact of a provisional character. Until the war finishes, a conquest in the juridical 
sense of the word cannot take place. That is what the vanquished as well as the invading power must 
recognize. The occupied territory is RQO\SURYLVLRQDOO\VXEMHFWHGWRWKHHQHP\¶VSRZHU.  
 
His contention of the relevant passage in original French read that: 
 
L'occupation est un simple fait d'un caractère provisoire. Jusqu'à ce que la guerre finisse, une conquête 
dans le sens juridique du mot ne peut avoir lieu. C'est ce que l'État vaincu doit reconnaître aussi bien que 
la puissance envahissante. Le territoire occupé n'est que provisoirement soumis au pouvoir de l'ennemi. 
 
Loening, supra n. 29, at 652, footnote omitted, emphasis added; English translation by the present author. 
See also Percy Bordwell, The Law of War Between Belligerents ± A History and Commentary, (Chicago:  
Callaghan and Co., 1908), p. 299; Graber, supra n. 43, at 66.  
48
 See G. Rolin--DHTXHP\QV µ&KURQLTXHGX'URLW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/D*XHUUH$FWXHOOH¶  Revue de 
Droit International et de Législation Comparée 643 at 690-+HVWDWHGWKDWµ$VVXUHUXQFHUWDLQRUGUHGDQV
les pays occupés de forceJDUDQWLUO¶DGPLQLVWUDWLRQUHJXOLqUHGHODMXVWLFHODSROLFHOHVFRPPXQLFDWLRQVOHV
transactions privées, en un mot, gouverner provisoirement ces pays occupés, est autant le devoir que le droit 
GX YDLQTXHU¶ µ$VVXULQJ D FHUWDLQ RUGHU LQ WKH FRXQWULHV Rccupied by force, guaranteeing the regular 
administration of justice, the police, the communications, the private transactions, in one word, governing 
provisionally the occupied states, is as much as the duty as the right of the vanquisher; translation by the 
present author). He explained how the Prussian policy was generally to conserve the local laws and 
governmental institutions. See also ibid., at 660-666, 676-685, and 690-693. 
For the literature supporting the temporary nature of belligerent occupation, see also Calvo, supra n. 39, at 
212, para. 2166; and Loening, supra n. 29, at 626-634, 650; Oppenheim (1917), supra n. 9, at 363-364; 
Graber, supra n. 43, at 41 and 56-57. 
49
 Feilchenfeld, supra n. 25, at 86, emphasis added. 
50
 He emphasised that the length of occupation depended on the duration of warfare in which both armies 




 See, for instance, ibid., at 11-12, paras 44-46. 
53
 Ibid., at 5, para. 11. His rejection of any change of permanent nature by occupation implies that such drastic 





Further, from the non-transfer of sovereignty to the occupying power can be inferred the 
unlawfulness of any unilateral and permanent step taken by the occupant, such as the 
annexation of occupied areas before the conclusion of peace.54 Related to this is what some 
scholars label as the µprinciple of preservation¶ RUµFRQVHUYDWLRQLVWSULQFLSOH¶55 According 
to this principle, the legal system of the occupied territory should be conserved,56 save in 
exceptional circumstances.57 7KHRFFXS\LQJSRZHU¶VH[FHSWLRQDOSRVVLELOLW\RIPRGLI\LQJ
local laws may be explained by the concept of µPLOLWDU\QHFHVVLW\¶58 Fraenkel invoked the 
GRFWULQHRIµLQFLGHQWDORULPSOLHGSRZHUV¶WRMXVWLI\WKHH[FHSWLRQDOSRZHUDFFRUGHGWRWKH
occupant.59 When undertaking sweeping forms of transformations in local administrative 
or political structures, the occupying power must discharge the onus of adducing rationales 
                                                 
 
54
 Graber, supra n. 43, at 68-69 (discussing also measures to extend the temporal scope of its laws beyond 
the occupation period, irrespective of the intention of the displaced sovereign government). As known, since 
1945, this principle has been subsumed in the ban on annexing a territory by use or threat to use force laid 
down in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. See also Article 1 of the UN Charter which sets forth that one of the 
UN purposes is to prohibit aggression. 
55
 See Ando, supra n. 24DQG*UHJRU\+)R[µ7KH2FFXSDWLRQRI,UDT¶Georgetown Journal of 
International Law %HQYHQLVWL¶VVWXG\VKRZVWKDWWKLVSULQFLSOHRZHVWRWKH,WDOLDQMXULVW3DVTXDOH)LRUH
Benvenisti (2008), supra n. 31, at 632, referring to:  Pasquale Fiore, Nuovo dritto internazionale pubblico 
(Milan: Casa Ed. e Tip. degli autori-ed,1865), at 443-444. Another prominent classic scholar who advocated 
WKLVµSULQFLSOH¶ZDV&KDUOHV&DOYR&KDUOHV0&DOYRLe Droit International Théorique et Pratique, 4th ed., 




 Writing in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, Rolin-Jaequemyns confidently affirmed that the Prussian 
policy in the context of the Franco-Prussian War generally met such a principle by retaining the local French 
laws and governmental institutions:  Rolin-Jaequemyns, supra n. 48, at 690-693. 
57
 %OXQWVFKOL DUJXHG WKDW µ6LH >GLH .ULHJVJHZDOW@ KDW VLFK DEHU ELV ]X GHILQLWLYHU 5HJHOXQJ GHU
Statsverhältnisse die Verfassung ändender und gesetzgeberischer Acte möglichst zu enthalten und darf die 
hergebrachte RechtsoUGQXQJQXUDXVGULQJHQGHQ*UQGHQDXVVHU:LUNVDPNHLW VHW]HQ¶ µ1HYHUWKHOHVV WKH
war-authority has possibly to conserve the constitution-changing and legislative acts and may set aside the 
H[LVWLQJOHJDORUGHURQO\RQLPPLQHQWJURXQG¶(QJOLVKWUDQVODWLRQby the present author):  Johaan Kasper 
Bluntschli, Das Moderne Kriegsrecht der Civilisierten Staaten, (Nördlingen:  C.H. Beck, 1866), at p. 8, para. 
36. See also ibidDWSSDUDµ'LH.ULHJVJHZDOWGDUIDOOHVGDVWKXQZDVGLHPLOLWlULVFKH1RWKZHQGigkeit 
erfordert, d. h. soweit ihre Massregeln als nöthig erscheinen, um den Kriegszweck mit Kriegsmitteln zu 
erreichen und in Uebereinstimmung sind mit dem allgemeinen Recht und dem Kriegsgebrauch der 
FLYLOLVLHUWHQ9|ONHU¶µ7KHZDU-authority allows all to be done that the military emergency demands, that is, 
insofar as its measures seem necessary in order to achieve the war-aim with war measures and as they are in 
agreement with the general right and war-XVDJHRIWKHFLYLOLVHGQDWLRQV¶WUDQVODWLRQE\WKH present author). 
See also Hall, supra n. 8, at 470, para. 155. 
58
 Hall, ibid., at 469 and 470, para. 155. For a considerably elaborate examination of how the concept of 
military necessity has transformed its understanding among the scholars, see Etienne Henry, Le Principe de 
nécessité militaire ± Histoire et actualité G¶XQH QRUPH Iondamentale du droit international humanitaire, 
(Paris:  A. Pedone, Paris, 2016).  
59
 Ernst Fraenkel, Military Occupation and the Rule of Law -Occupational Government in the Rhineland 




IRU WKLV ZLWKLQ WKH HODVWLF QRWLRQ RI PLOLWDU\ QHFHVVLW\ DV H[FHSWLRQV WR WKH µJHQHUDO
SULQFLSOH¶60 The principle that the legal systems of the occupied territory61  should be 
preserved as much as possible had the benefit of maintaining orderliness of social life 
among the local inhabitants under occupation.62 In a more macroscopic standpoint, this 
was conveniently attuned to preserve the stability of the European political order in the 
nineteenth century.63  
 
4. Rationalizing the Recourse to the Travaux Préparatoires 
Exploring how the drafters of the legal instruments on the laws of war or IHL understood 
the temporal span of occupation is the primary objective of this paper. For that purpose, it 
is essential to examine at length the travaux préparatoires of the relevant legal instruments. 
These are:  the Brussels Declaration (1874); the Hague Regulations (1899/1907); the 
Geneva Civilians Convention (1949); and the API (1977).  
 
Before perusing the minute details of the historical documents, it is first of all essential to 
defend such a methodology. To begin with, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT) SURFODLPV WKDW µ[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
DQGLQWKHOLJKWRILWVREMHFWDQGSXUSRVH¶The key elements stated in Article 31 of the 
VCLT are the ordinary meaning of the text, its context, and the object and purpose of the 
treaty in question.64 7KHQ$UWLFOHRIWKH9&/7SUHVFULEHVWKDWµ[r]ecourse may be had 
to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and 
the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to 
article 31:  (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is 
PDQLIHVWO\DEVXUGRUXQUHDVRQDEOH¶65 Hence, in case no appropriate meaning emerges by 
way of interpretation according to Article 31 VCLT, the preparatory work constitutes the 
                                                 
 
60
 As the practice evolved through WWI to the Inter-War period, and to the end of the twentieth century, 
scholarly opinions came to accommodate expansive remit of power exercised by an occupying power in 
UHOLDQFHRQ WKHPDOOHDEOHQRWLRQRI µPLOLWDU\QHFHVVLW\¶6HH Feilchenfeld, supra n. 25, at 86. For a more 
recent literature that suggests a wider scope of prescriptive and administrative power of the occupant on the 
basis of the notion of military necessity, see Bhuta, supra n. 28, at 728. 
61
 See Calvo, supra n. 39, at 213, para. 2167 (describing the nature of belligerent occupation as similar to 
that of prisoners of war that conserved their liberty on parole and highlighting the need for the occupying 
SRZHUWRUHVSHFWµOHVSULQFLSHVGXGURLWQDWXUHO¶ 
62
 Giladi (2012), supra n. 21, at 86 
63
 Bhuta, supra n. 28, at 740. The conservationist principle is incorporated into Article 43 Hague Regulations 
and Article 64 GCIV. Its relevancy in the recent practice in Iraq, see, for instance, Robert Kolb, Ius in bello, 
Le droit international des conflits armés, precis 2nd ed. (Basle:  Helbing and Lichtenhahn, 2009), at 313; Fox, 
supra n. 55.  
64
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 For reliance on the travaux préparatoires WRµFRQILUPWKHPHDQLQJ¶RIWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQUHDFKHGE\WKH




means to be invoked.66 Unlike state practice or the circumstances existing at the time of 
the conclusion of a treaty, the travaux preparatoires KDYHDGYDQWDJHRIEHLQJµWDQJLEOH¶
DQGµFRQFUHWH¶67 As noted by the International Law Commission (ILC),68  the rationale for 
relying on the preparatory work can be summarized in a three-fold way. Their use can serve 
to:  (1) confirm the meaning of a treaty text; 69  (2) determine the meaning that remains 
indefinite or obscure;70 and (3) search for the meaning in the event that the µJHQHUDOUXOH¶
of interpretation in Article 31 of the VCLT yields irrational outcomes.71 Under Article 32 
VCLT, the weight of drafting records for the purpose of interpreting a treaty is understood 
DVµVXSSOHPHQWDU\¶.72 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has routinely recognised the 
importance of resorting to the preparatory work of the treaty.73 
 
Admittedly, the classification of the travaux DV WKH µVXSSOHPHQWDU\¶PHDQVZKLFKPD\
indicate a crude µKLHUDUFKLFDOVWUXFWXUH¶RI$UWLFOHVDQG9&/774 do not suggest that 
they can be called into play only subsequent to the general means of interpretation 
enumerated in Article 31 VCLT. In the practice, they are taken into account often 
concurrently with the general means of interpretation under Article 31 VCLT. As noted by 
Shabtai Rosenne, in the legal proceedings it is hard to know by what processes and how 
much the travaux préparatoires have actually contributed to the judges of international 
tribunals in arriving at particular opinions on the meaning of a treaty text that they regard 
as clear.75 In his view, claiming that recourse to the preparatory work can be justified only 
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after the meaning obtained by the interpretation based on the text of the treaty turns out to 
be unclear verges on DµOHJDOILFWLRQ¶76  
 
Further, the role and weight of the travaux in confirming the meaning obtained by the 
means of interpretation under Article 31 VCLT is not entirely evident. One salient question 
in this regard is what an interpreter has to do in case there is a discordance between the 
ordinary meaning of the treaty text and the meaning extrapolated from the travaux 
préparatoires.77  On one hand, there is a proposition that the allegedly clear meaning 
arrived at under Article 31 should be followed.78 On the other hand, Schwebel, the former 
judge of the ICJ, underscored the meaning revealed by the travaux as the evidence of the 
intention of the parties. He even endorsed the possibility of µcorrecting¶ the ordinary 
meaning.79 
  
This paper contends that the text of Article 6(3) GCIV, while not obscure, leaves much of 
incoherence in the sense of sub-paragraph (a) of Article 32 VCLT. A greater cause of 
perplexity is that Article 6(3) GCIV, if construed pursuant to the primary methods of 
interpretation under Article 31 VCLT, may lead even to a possibly unreasonable result 
within the meaning of sub-paragraph (b) of Article 32 VCLT.  Article 6(3) GCIV provides 
that: 
 
In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease 
one year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power 
shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises 
the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles 
of the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143. 
 
7KLVSDUDJUDSKPDQGDWRULO\µVKDOO¶HQGVWKHOHJDOHIIHFWRIQHDUO\RQH-third of the rules 
on occupation contained in Part III of GCIV, one year after the general end of military 
operations. Those provisions that will cease to operate after the passage only of one year 
include basic rules affecting daily lives of civilians under occupation (Articles 50 and 55 
                                                 
 
76
 Ibid (adding that recourse to the preparatory works should be deemed as the acceptable means of 
interpretation). 
77
 Le Bouthillier, supra n. at 847-848. 
78
 Eric Canal-)RUJXHVµ5HPDUTXHVVXUOHUHFRXUVDX[WUDYDX[SUHSDUDWRLUHVGDQVOHFRQWHQWLHX[
LQWHUQDWLRQDO¶Revue Generale de Droit International Public 901-937, at 913. 
79
 See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel in ICJ, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial 
Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of 15 February 1995, ICJ 
5HSRUWVSDWSKROGLQJWKDWµ>W@KHtravaux préparatoires are no less evidence of the intention 
of the parties when they contradict as when they confirm the allegedly clear meaning of the text or context 





GCIV),80  and internment or administrative detention (Article 78 GCIV).81  As will be 
explored in section 7 below, such an µH[FOXVLonDU\ FODXVH¶ seems to contradict the 
humanitarian object and purpose of the GCIV overall. The limited temporal applicability 
of those provisions in case of protracted occupation also seems to be incongruent in the 
light of the underlying objective of Article 8 GCIV. According to this provision, the 
protected persons in occupied territory are not supposed to renounce in part or in whole the 
rights guaranteed under the GCIV.82  
 
Such a one-year temporal delimitation laid down in Article 6(3) GCIV is markedly 
distinguishable from other legal instruments that include no such equivalent clause. As will 
be examined below, Article 3(b) API reverts to the pre-1949 customary rule, prescribing 
that ERWKWKH*&,9DQGWKH$3,µVKDOOFHDVH«RQWKHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKHRFFXSDWLRQ¶7KH
question is how to explain coherently such perceived inconsistency between Article 6(3) 
GCIV on one hand and the pertinent provisions of the 1907 Hague Regulations and of the 
API on the other. Such ambiguity furnishes additional ground to justify relying on the 
travaux préparatoires pursuant to Article 32 VCLT.  
 
The inquiries into the intention and understanding of the drafters were forcefully defended 
by one of the prominent scholars of international law in the twentieth century. Writing 
GHFDGHVEHIRUHWKH,/&¶VGUDIWWH[WVRI9&/7HPHUJHG+HUVFK/DXWHUSDFKWDUJXHGWKDW
µWKHREMHFWRI LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LV WRDUULYHDW WKH LQWHQWLRQRI WKHSDUWLHV ex signis maxime 
SUREDELOLEXV¶.83 He PDGHSODLQ WKDW µWKH LQWHQWLRQRI WKHSDUWLHVPXVWEH WKHSDUDPRXQW
IDFWRU LQ WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WUHDWLHV¶ ZDUQLQJ DJDLQVW UHFRXUVH WR WHFKQLFDO UXOHV RI
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRUSUHVXPSWLRQVWKDWµPD\SOD\KDYRFZLWKWKHLQWHQWLRQVRIWKHSDUWLHV¶84 In 
his later work, Lauterpacht highlighted that the travaux préparatoires FRQVWLWXWHGHYHQµD
fundamental element, maybe the most important, in the matter of interpretation of 
WUHDWLHV¶85 As if to evoke semiotics, he considered the text of a treaty as a sign which can 
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acquire substantive meanings when read together with the drafting history.86 Admittedly, 
WKH µLQWHQWLRQDOLVW¶ WKHVLVGHIHQGHGE\+HUVFK/DXWHUSDFKWZDVSUHPLVHGRQ µWKH IUDJLOH
assumption that the drafting process was neatly documentHG DQG UHDGLO\ DYDLODEOH¶87 
Further, Philip Allott JRHV WR WKH OHQJWK RI DIILUPLQJ WKDW µ>D@ WUHDW\ LV D GLVDJUHHPHQW
UHGXFHGWRZULWLQJ¶88 Bearing those general caveats in mind, this author still defends the 
method of diagnosing the travaux préparatoires of the legal instruments on belligerent 
RFFXSDWLRQ7KLVLVEHFDXVHLWVDLPLVQRWWRILQGDQ\µFRPPRQRUXQLIRUP¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJ
among the framers (the attainment of which, WRWKLVDXWKRU¶VPLQG, seems illusory). Instead, 
this paper seeks to examine how (differently) the question of long-running occupation was 
perceived among the drafters.89 It should also be ascertained if the drafters envisaged 
protracted occupation of decades-length duration.  
 
It might be countered that those questions are not directly related to the text of the treaties 
in question. Yet, this paper considers that these are points of substantive nature affecting 
the interpretation of the treaty-based rules on the legal regime of occupation. Even Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, whose opinion was at odds with the intentionalist theory represented by 
Hersch Lauterpacht,90 recognized a supplementary function of the travaux preparatoires. 
It is well-known that as one of the rapporteurs of the International Law Commission (ILC), 
Fitzmaurice contributed, together with Waldock, to shaping the current texts of the VCLT 
(including Articles 31 and 32). In addition to the situations covered by Article 32 VCLT, 
Fitzmaurice rationalized DµOHJLWLPDWH¶UHFRXUVHWR WKHSUHSDUDWRU\ZRUNDOVRZKHUHµWKH
object is not the interpretation of the text as such, but the ascertainment or establishment 
of a point of substance LQUHODWLRQWR WKH7UHDW\¶91 In this light, to recall, in the case of 
Reservations to the Genocide Convention, the ICJ had recourse to the preparatory work of 
the Genocide Convention not for the purpose of elucidating any particular provision of the 
Genocide Convention but of ascertaining if there existed any right of the parties to enter 
unilateral reservations to it. The travaux were scrutinized with a view to assessing the 
existence of any implied or tacit understanding to that effect. Accordingly, for the purpose 
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of verifying the nature and temporal length of occupation, it is legitimate to explore the 
preparatory work of the laws of war. 
 
As briefly discussed above, this paper considers that explorations of the drafting records of 
the classic legal landscape, ranging from the Brussels Declaration to the Hague Regulations, 
can help obtain WKHGUDIWHUV¶LQWHQWLRQDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJDVWRWKHWHPSRUDOSDUDPHWHUVRI
occupation. In view of special importance of the Brussels Declaration as the model for the 
subsequent Hague Regulations, in the following section, much of in-depth examinations 
will be expended on this aborted legal instrument. The ambit of those examinations will 
encompass the Lieber Code (1863) and the Oxford Manual on the Laws of War on Land 
(1880). The former, which constituted the first effort to codify the laws of war, was 
prepared during American Civil War by Francis Lieber, then the legal advisor to the United 
States (or Union) Force. The latter was adopted by the Institute of International Law (1880) 
as a crystallization of the leading academic opinions on the laws of war at that time. 
Admittedly, neither of those documents was purported as treaties. Yet, they have been 
referenced as the authoritative source in the doctrines and practice. Hence, it is warranted 
to include those documents together with the relevant legal instruments on laws of war.  
 
5. The Temporary Nature of Occupation That Can be Ascertained from the Legal 
Text of the Laws of War and Their Travaux Préparatoires  
5.1. The Lieber Code (1863) and the Provisional Nature of Occupation 
$UWLFOHRIWKH/LHEHU&RGHSURFODLPVWKDWµ[m]artial Law in a hostile country consists 
in the suspension, by the occupying military authority, of the criminal and civil law, and 
of the domestic administration and government in the occupied place or territory, and in 
the substitution of military rule and force for the same, as well as in the dictation of general 
ODZVDVIDUDVPLOLWDU\QHFHVVLW\UHTXLUHVWKLVVXVSHQVLRQVXEVWLWXWLRQRUGLFWDWLRQ¶By 
referring to the suspension of the local laws of the occupied land, Article 3(1) of the Lieber 
Code implicitly certifies the interim nature of occupation.92 Further, the last clause of 
Article 32 of the Lieber Code makes plain that any permanent change must await the 
conclusion of peace. Hence, this corroborates the basic understanding that any suspension, 
change or abolition of legal relationships done during the period of occupation is 
precarious.93 Such transient and provisional nature of occupation was made express in the 
subsequent United States military manuals. For instance, the military manual of 1914 stated 
WKDW µ[m]ilitary occupation is based upon the fact of possession and is essentially 
provisional until the conclusion of peace or the annihilation of the adversary, 
ZKHQ«PLOLWDU\RFFXSDWLRQWHFKQLFDOO\FHDVHV¶94 The temporary nature of occupation as a 
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general principle is reaffirmed in the most recent United States Law of War Manual 
(2015),95 the approach that is in line with the 1880 Oxford Manual, as will be seen below. 
  
5.2. The Travaux Préparatoires of the Brussels Declaration ± the Temporariness of 
Occupation as a Corollary of the Non-Transfer of Sovereignty 
$UWLFOHRIWKH%UXVVHOV'HFODUDWLRQSURFODLPVWKDWµ[t]he authority of the legitimate Power 
being suspended and having in fact passed into the hands of the occupants, the latter shall 
take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and 
VDIHW\¶ 96  7KH ZRUG µVXVSHQGHG¶ LQ $UWLFOH  RI WKH %UXVVHOV 'HFODUDWLRQ suggests a 
provisional nature of belligerent occupation.  
 
The closer look at the records of the Brussels Conference (1874) shows that when its earlier 
draft texts were compared to the final one, the clear change in the tenor of the relevant texts 
occurred during the drafting process. The gravity was shifted to emphasize the temporal 
nature of occupation and the thrust that belligerent occupation would bring about no 
handing down of sovereignty (at least during the period of occupation and until the 
conclusion of a treaty of peace). Article 1 of the very first draft text, which had been 
prepared by the Russian delegate for the purpose of DFRPPLVVLRQ¶VGLVFXVVLRQV97 provided 
that µ[t]he occupation by the enemy of a part of the territory of a state in war with the former 
suspends, by the fact itself, the authority of the legitimate power of that [occupied] state 
therein and substitute the authority of the military power of the occupying state [with that 
RI WKHRFFXSLHGVWDWH@¶98 2Q WKHRQHKDQG WKLVSURYLVLRQFRQWDLQHG WKHYHUE µVXVSHQG¶, 
which, as in the case of Article 2 of the Brussels Declaration,99 indicated the temporary 
FKDUDFWHURIWKHRFFXS\LQJSRZHU¶VDXWKRULW\2QWKHRWKHUWKDWYHUEµVXEVWLWXWH¶ included 
in that provision might be considered redolent of WKHGRFWULQHRIµVXEVWLWXWHGVRYHUHLJQW\¶
examined above. Still, this should not be viewed as conceding the transfer of sovereignty, 
an option that the Lieber Code suggested as a possibility of post-war settlement. 
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 This should not be conflated with the text of Article 1 of the revised draft text presented by Baron Jomini 
of Russia at the Plenary, which is discussed above. 
98
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In the following plenary session convened on 5 August 1874, Baron Jomini of the Russian 
delegation, who acted as the President of the Conference, presented his own amended 
text.100  When putting forward another draft text on 11 August 1874, he changed the 
wording of Article 1 of the Russian draft text (which was renumbered as Article 2). This 
might otherwise have appeared to be a µVOLJKW¶ WH[WXDO DPHQGPHQW. Yet, on closer 
inspection, in that process, the tenor of the relevant text was transformed in such a manner 
that shed any implication of a transmission of sovereignty. Following the further 
modification made by the Commission, Article 2 of the final draft came to read that µ[t]he 
authority of the legitimate Power being suspended and having in fact passed into the hands 
of the occupants, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, 
DVIDUDVSRVVLEOHSXEOLFRUGHUDQGVDIHW\¶.101 
 
There were two main changes that had special bearing on the question of attribution of 
sovereignty. First, after amendment, the text of what had been Article 1 of the original 
Russian draft text (renumbered as Article 2) came to confirm that the effect of belligerent 
occupation was the suspended sovereign.102 The introductory phrase of this provision µWKH
authority of the legitimate Power being suspended, and having in fact passed into the hands 
RIWKHRFFXSDQWV¶103 ZDVEHUHIWRIWKHZRUGµVXEVWLWXWH¶6HFRQG, the text was modified to 
elucidate only the factual control assumed by an occupying power, and not legal title to the 
occupied territory. 104   The wording µ«ZDV VXVSHQGHG E\ WKH IDFW RI RFFXSDWLRQ WKH
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µ7KH
authority of the legal power being suspended or having passed in fact between the hands of the occupant, the 
latter shall take all the measures that depend on him in order to establish and ensure, as much as possible, the 
SXEOLFRUGHUDQGVDIHW\¶WUDQVODWLRQE\WKHSUHVHQWDXWKRUHPSKDVLVDGGHG/DWHUDWWKH&RQIHUHQFHWZR
editorial changes were further entered in the wording. Apart from these, Article 2 of the final text was 
LGHQWLFDOWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VWH[Wibid., at 297. 7KHWH[WUHYHUWHGWRWKHSKUDVHµO¶RUGUHHWODYLHSXEOLTXH¶ 
102
  This had already been mentioned in Article 1 of the first original draft text:  ibid., at 277 (-RPLQL¶VGUDIW
text of 5 August 1874). 
103
 Translation by ICRC. 
104
 $QRWKHUFKDQJHWKDWLQWHUYHQHGZLWKUHVSHFWWR$UWLFOHZDVWKDWWKHUHIHUHQFHWRµWKHGXW\¶RIDQRFFXSDQW
to take all measures to restore and ensure order and public life was added to Article 2. This provision read 
WKDWµ/¶DXWRULWpGXSRXYRLUOpJDOpWDQWVXVSHQGXHGHIDLWSDUO¶RFFXSDWLRQLOHVWGXGHYRLUGHO¶ƜWDWRFFXSDQW
GHSUHQGUHWRXWHVOHVPHVXUHVTXLGpSHQGHQWGHOXLHQYXHGHUpWDEOLUHWG¶DVVXUHUDXWDQWTX¶LOHVWSRVVLEOH
O¶RUGUHHW ODYLHSXEOLTXH¶  0LQLVWqUHGHV$IIDLUHVƜWUDQJqUHV supra QDW µ7KHDXWKRULW\RI WKH




RFFXS\LQJSRZHUWDNHV«¶ZDVUHSODFHGE\WKHSKUDVHµ«Zas suspended and passed in 
IDFWLQWRWKHKDQGVRIWKHRFFXSDQWWKHODWWHUWDNHV«¶105 Accordingly, it became clearer 
that after a series of modifications, the text that was finally adopted as Article 2 highlighted 
no transfer of sovereignty of the occupied state.106   
 
5.3. Indications for the Possibility of Protracted Occupation in the Travaux 
Préparatories of the Brussels Declaration 
Notwithstanding the foregoing examinations that indicated the provisional nature of 
occupation understood by the drafters of the Brussels Declaration, at the Brussels 
Conference, there were some indicia that might be read as recognizing the possibility of 
long-spanning occupation. At one point in the complex process of amendment, the text of 
Article 1(2) of the Brussels Declaration was formulated in such a manner as to come close 
to allowing for such a possible reading. At the Plenary session of the Brussels Conference, 
Baron Jomini of Russia introduced an amendment to the earlier draft text of Article 1(2) of 
the Brussels Declaration.107 The revised draft text provided that µ[t]he occupation extends 
only to the territory where such authority has been established and lasts only so long as it 
µDXVVL ORQJWHPSV TX¶HOOH¶ LV DEOH WR EH H[HUFLVHG¶108 This paragraph highlighted that 
occupDWLRQGHSHQGHGRQERWKVSDWLDODQGWHPSRUDOVFRSHRIµDXWKRULW\¶WREHH[HUFLVHG109 
It may have been construed as authorizing an occupying power to prolong its occupation 
insofar as it had the capacity to exert territorial control (and this, even when there was no 
actual control). As will be examined below, a similar text that addressed both the spatial 
                                                 
 
take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, the public order and safety; 
translation by the present author). Yet, in his draft of 11 August 1874, Baron Jomoni deleted any reference 
WRWKHµGXW\¶RIWKHRFFXSDQWSUHVXPDEO\WRIHQGRIIDQ\Uepercussions of introducing such positive duty:  
ibid., at 284. After the reading before the Commission, this text was slightly modified to the wording that 
corresponds to the text of Articles 43 Hague Regulations (1899/1907):  ibid., at 285 and 288. 
105
 The original wording reads that µ«pWDQWVXVSHQGXHGHIDLWSDUO¶RFFXSDWLRQO¶ƜWDWRFFXSDQWSUHQG«¶
ZDV UHSODFHG E\ WKH SKUDVH µ«pWDQW VXVSHQGXH HW SDVVpH GH IDLW HQWUH OHV PDLQV GH O¶RFFXSDQW FHOXL-ci 
SUHQG«¶(translation by the present author). 
106
 As an aVLGHWKHZRUGµDFWXDOO\¶LQWKHXQRIILFLDO(QJOLVKWUDQVODWLRQFRUUHVSRQGVWRWKH)UHQFKZRUGVµGH
IDLW¶$FORVHUHTXLYDOHQWZRXOGEHWKH/DWLQµGHIDFWR¶Graber, supra n. 43, at 46-47. 
107
 Baron Jomini modified the original Russian draft text twice prioU WR WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V VHVVLRQRQ
August 1874:  In his draft presented in the plenary on 5 August 1874, new provision (Article 1) that defined 
occupied territory was introduced. Part of what had been Articles 1 and 2 of the original Russian draft text 
was amalgamated into Article 2 of the modified draft text:  0LQLVWqUHGHV$IIDLUHVƜWUDQJqUHVDocuments 
supra n. 40, at 277. 
108
 The original French text prescribed that µ/¶RFFXSDWLRQQHV¶HWHQGTX¶DX[WHUULWRLUHVRFHWWHDXWRULWpHVW
établie et ne dure TX¶DXVVLORQJWHPSVTX¶HOOHHVWHQPHVXUHGHO¶H[HUFHU¶ :  ibid., at 277, emphasis added, 
translation by the present author. 
109
 See Article 1(2) of the draft text proposed by President of the Conference (Baron Jomini, Russia) on 5 
August 1874. This read that µ/¶RFFXSDWLRQQHV¶HWHQGTX¶DX[WHUULWRLUHVRFHWWHDXWRULWpHVWpWDEOLHHWQHGXUH
TX¶DXVVLORQJWHPSVTX¶HOOHHVWHQPHVXUHGHO¶H[HUFHU¶µ7KHRFFXSDWLRQH[WHQGVRQO\WRWKHWHUULWRULHVZKHUH
that authority is established and endure only so long as it LV LQ D SRVLWLRQ WR H[HUFLVH LW¶  ibid., at 277 
(translation by the present author). As discussed above, the Swedish and Norwegian joint delegation 




and temporal ambit of occupation was introduced as the last sentence of Article 41 of the 
Oxford Manual (1880).  
 
Following further amendments,110 the text of Article 1(2) of the Brussels Declaration that 
was finally agreed upon VWLSXODWHVWKDWµ[t]he occupation extends only to the territory where 
VXFKDXWKRULW\KDVEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGDQGFDQEHH[HUFLVHG¶111 In short, this text stopped 
short of expressly characterizing occupation as an interim or precarious arrangement.112 
Nor did the text indicate any temporal parameters of occupation. The drafters of the 
Brussels Declaration understood the legal regime of occupation to be cognizable on the 
basis of the factual situation of control. This was the case, even WKRXJKLQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
session, Baron Jomini explained that in his new text of Article 1(2), the temporal aspect 
was still implicit in his revised text.113 He pointed out that µWKHRFFXSDWLRQODVWVDVLWµHQ
tanW TX¶HOOH¶ LV H[HUFLVHG E\ IDFW¶114 One might be tempted to contend that both the 
drafting records and the final text of Article 1(2) of the Brussels Declaration did not entirely 
exclude the possibility of the legal regime of occupation lasting for so long as the factual 
state (or capacity) of control persisted. However, even if this reading may be accepted, it 
seems far-fetched to maintain that the drafters of the Brussels Declaration envisaged a 
protracted form of occupation that would endure for decennia. Further, the intention of the 
drafters of the Brussels Declaration may be evaluated alongside the text of the Oxford 
Manual, which was, as will be discussed immediately below, crafted only six years after 
the adoption of the former.  
                                                 
 
110
 Subsequent to %DURQ-RPLQL¶VIXUWKHUDPHQGPHQWWR$UWLFOH which was introduced on 11 August 
1874, this paragraph read that µ[t]he occupation extends only to the territory where such authority is 
established DQGDVLWµHQWDQWTX¶HOOH¶FDQEHH[HUFLVHG¶:  ibid., at 284. The original text in French proclaimed 
that µ/¶RFFXSDWLRQQHV¶pWHQGTX¶DX[WHUULWRLUHVRFHWWHDXWRULWpHVWpWDEOLHHWHQWDQWTX¶HOOHHVWHQPHVXUH
GHV¶H[HUFHU¶ :  ibid., at 284, emphasis added, translation by the present author. 
111




 It should be noted that the deletion of any reference to the temporal factor was motivated not for the reason 
related to any considerations of temporal length of occupation. Instead, this expurgation was done lest such 
a clause might imply that physical presence of troops in occupied region was indispensable for belligerent 
occupation:  Graber, supra QDW&RPSDUH0LQLVWqUHGHV$IIDLUHVƜWUDQJqUHV supra n. 40, at 105 
(General de Leer of Russia stressing the need for a part of the occupying army to secure its position and line 
of communication with other corps) and 106 (Federal &RORQHO+DPPHURI6ZLW]HUODQGDUJXLQJWKDWµ3RXU
SRXUYRLUODPDLQWHQLUG¶DLOOHXUVLOQ¶HVWSDV QrFHVVDLUHGHGLVSRVHUGHJUDQGHVWURXSHVLOVXIILWG¶XQKRPPH
SRXUYXTX¶LOVRLWUHVSHFWpG¶XQEXUHDXGHSRVWHGHWpOpJUDSKHVG¶XQH&RPPLVVLRQTXHOFRQTXHpWDEOLHGDQV
OD ORFDOLWp HW IRQFWLRQQDQW VDQV RSSRVLWLRQ¶ µ)RU WKH SXUSRVH RI PDLQWDLQLQJ WKH occupation, it is not 
necessary to have at disposal grand troops; it is sufficient to have a man, provided that he is respected, or a 
post office, or a telegram office, or any other commission established in the locality and functioning without 
RSSRVLWLRQ¶; translation by the present author). 
113
 Ibid., at 106 (lieutenant-colonel Staaff, the co-representative of Sweden and Norway;12 August 1874). 
114
 The original French statement read that µO¶occupation dure WDQWTX¶HOOHV¶H[HUFHGHIDLW¶ ibid., at 107, 
emphasis added, translation by the present author. See also ibid., at 277 and 284. This phrase might be taken 
as endorsing the view that as long as the factual situation of a foreign military control lasts, occupation 
continues concordantly, so that prolonged occupation would be justified. Yet, from the discussions of the 






5.4. The Oxford Manual (1880) ± the Approach of Setting the Temporary Nature of 
Occupation as a µGeneral Principle¶ While Exceptionally Recognizing a Possibility of 
Prolonged Occupation 
The Oxford Manual is distinguishable in making it explicit and unambiguously clear that 
belligerent occupation is an interim arrangement. Article 6 of the Manual UHDGVWKDWµ[n]o 
invaded territory is regarded as conquered until the end of the war; until that time the 
RFFXSDQWH[HUFLVHVLQVXFKWHUULWRU\RQO\D³GHIDFWR´SRZHUessentially provisional in 
FKDUDFWHU¶115 So far, this provision constitutes the only major legal document that expressly 
recognizes the temporary nature of occupation as a general rule.  
 
Nevertheless, two qualifications ought to be made. First, the qualifyiQJZRUGµHVVHQWLDOO\¶
in Article 6 suggests that no-interim occupation is exceptionally permissible. Second, 
Article 41 of the Oxford Manual (1880), which corresponds to Article 1 of the Brussels 
Declaration, seems to recognize the potentially longer occupation in tune with the duration 
of DIRUHLJQSRZHU¶VFRQWURO$UWLFOHRIWKHOxford Manual stipulates that:  
 
A territory is regarded as occupied when, as the consequence of invasion by hostile forces, 
the State to which it belongs has ceased, in fact, to exercise its ordinary authority therein, 
and the invading State is alone in a position to maintain order there. The limits within 
which this state of affairs exists determine the extent and duration of the occupation.116  
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moment l'occupant n'y exerce qu'un pouvoir de fait HVVHQWLHOOHPHQWSURYLVRLUH¶ 
116
 Oxford Manual (1880), Article 41, English translation by the ICRC, emphasis added. The original in 





trouve être seul à même d'y maintenir l'ordre. Les limites dans lesquelles ce fait se produit déterminent 
l'étendue et la durée de l'occupation. 
Apart from Articles 6 and 41 discussed here, see also a note preceding section C(a) (public property) that 
contains Articles 50-7KLVVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHRFFXSDQW¶VSRZHURYHUSURSHUW\PD\EHFRQVWUDLQHGIt reads 
that: 
 
Si l'occupant est substitué à l'Etat ennemi pour le gouvernement des territoires envahis, il n'y exerce point 
cependant un pouvoir absolu. Tant que le sort de ces territoires est en suspens, c'est-à-dire jusqu'à la paix, 
l'occupant n'est pas libre de disposer de ce qui appartient encore à l'ennemi et ne peut servir aux opérations 
de la guerre. 
(If the occupant is substituted for the enemy State for the government of the invaded territories, s/he still 
does not exercise any absolute power. So long as the fate of these [occupied] territories is in suspense, that 
is until peace, the occupant is not free to dispose of what appears still to the enemy and cannot make use of 
them for the war operation). 
 
,QVWLWXWGH'URLW,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ5pJOHPHQWDWLRQGHV/RLVHW&RXWXPHVGHOD*XHUUH0DQXHOGHVLois de la 
*XHUUH¶5DSSRUWHXU0*XVWDYH0R\QLHU-1882) 5 $QQXDLUHGHO¶LQVWLWXWGH'URLW,QWHUQDWLRQDO168 




The last sentence of Article 41 makes plain that the temporal sweep (alongside 
geographical reach) of occupation rests upon the factual nature of occupation, which is 
defined in the first sentence. The gist is that by making the determination of the duration 
of occupation contingent upon the factual situations (the aspect that is more clearly 
articulated by the original French text), Article 41 of the Oxford Manual may be read as 
admitting of a lengthier period of occupation as an exception. In this light, there is a 
measure of coherence in the use of the qualifying word µHVVHQWLDOO\¶ LQ$UWLFOHRI WKH
Oxford Manual. This adverb can be taken as qualifying the general requirement that 
RFFXSDWLRQEHµSURYLVLRQDO¶ 
 
5.5. The Travaux Preparatoires of the Hague Regulations and the Provisional Nature 
of Occupation 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations (1899/1907) reads that µ>W@KH DXWKRULW\ RI WKH
legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take 
all steps in his power to re-establish and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, 
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force iQ WKH FRXQWU\¶117 As 
briefly noted above, this provision is the consolidation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Brussels 
Declaration.118 When Article 43 Hague Regulations is compared with the earlier equivalent 
provisions of the Brussels Declaration, one may discern two salient differences, which are 
of special relevance to ascertaining the temporal length of occupation. They are:  (1) the 
omission of Article 43 Hague Regulations to mention expressly the suspended nature of 
the authority of the legitimate Power; and (2) the obliteration of references to the 
exceptional power of the occupant to µmodify, suspend and replace¶ the local laws, which 
was, under the Brussels Declaration, exercisable in case of necessity.119 
 
With respect to point (2), the deletion of the extensive power granted to the occupant to 
change the laws in force in the occupied territory may be considered to reflect WKHGUDIWHUV¶
due recognition of the precarious character of the legal regime of occupation. This issue 
will be addressed in section 6 below. Turning to point (1), when adopting Article 43 of the 
1899 Hague Regulations, the delegates to the 1899 Hague Conference trimmed the text of 
$UWLFOH  RI WKH %UXVVHOV 'HFODUDWLRQ  µWKH DXWKRULW\ RI WKH OHJLWLPDWH SRZHU EHLQg 
                                                 
 
117
 Translation into English by the ICRC. 7KHDXWKHQWLF)UHQFKWH[WVWLSXODWHVWKDWµ/
DXWRULWpGXSRXYRir légal 
ayant passé de fait entre les mains de l'occupant, celui-ci prendra toutes les mesures qui dépendent de lui en 
vue de rétablir et d'assurer, autant qu'il est possible, l'ordre et la vie publics en respectant, sauf empêchement 
absolu, les lois en vLJXHXUGDQVOHSD\V¶ 
118
 $UWLFOHRIWKH%UXVVHOV'HFODUDWLRQUHDGVWKDWµ>Z@ith this object he shall maintain the laws which were 
LQIRUFHLQWKHFRXQWU\LQWLPHRISHDFHDQGVKDOOQRWPRGLI\VXVSHQGRUUHSODFHWKHPXQOHVVQHFHVVDU\¶
Translation into English by the ICRC. 7KHDXWKHQWLF)UHQFKWH[WSURYLGHVWKDWµ¬FHWHIIHWLOPDLQWLHQGUDOHV




 As an aside, another key difference introduced by the Hague Regulations is the paraphrasing of the term 
µQpFHVVLWp¶µQHFHVVLW\¶E\WKHZRUGLQJµHPSrFKHPHQWDEVROX¶µXQOHVVDEVROXWHO\SUHYHQWHG¶ZKLFKKDGQR




VXVSHQGHGDQGKDYLQJ LQIDFWSDVVHG LQWR WKHKDQGVRI WKHRFFXSDQW«¶120 In so doing, 
they expunged the phrase that was indicative of the provisional effect of occupation, 
namely, the phrDVH µEHLQJVXVSHQGHGDQG¶121 It was the Belgian delegate that proposed 
such deletion at a sub-commission meeting on 8th June 1899.122 Unfortunately, the minutes 
of the meeting show no indication as to his rationale.123  
 
In retrospect, the GHOHWLRQRIWKHNH\ZRUGµVXVSHQGHG¶in the drafting stage might be read 
as suggesting a FKDQJHLQWKHGUDIWHUV¶RSLQLRQDVWRWKHWHPSRUDOVSDQ. This might be taken 
as allowing room for protracted occupation. Nevertheless, as noted above, Article 43 
Hague Regulations was based on the amalgamation of the texts of Articles 2 and 3 Brussels 
Declaration. Contrary to Article 1(2), Article 2 of the Brussels Declaration expressly 
indicated the suspended nature of territorial sovereignty. Hence, one may still hypothesize 
that when adopting the text of Article 43 Hague Regulations, the drafters assumed the 
temporariness of occupation. Surely, for all such drafting records, it remains true that 
nothing in the text of the Hague Regulations spells out expressly the temporary nature of 
occupation. At least, one can claim that the applicability of the Hague Regulations to cases 
of prolonged occupation is not precluded. 
  
6. The Traditional Laws of War and the Correlation between the Provisional Nature 
of Occupation and the Limited Degree of Power Exercisable by the Occupying Power 
± the Travaux Préparatoires and the Doctrines 
6.1. Overview 
Admittedly, there is no logical correlation between the provisional nature of occupation 
and the limited degree of power with which an occupier is endowed.124 Hence, it may be 
contended that measuring the power of the occupant is not decisive for ascertaining the 
length of occupation. Still, if the pivotal logic of occupation demands abstention from 
undermining the sovereignty of the displaced government of the occupied state, it seems 
reasonable that the power exercisable by the occupant in transforming local laws and 
administrative structure should be generally restrained. The lengthier the temporal span of 
occupation, the greater the need for the occupier to take appropriate administrative and 
legislative measures to secure the wellbeing of the inhabitants.125 In view of these, the 
                                                 
 
120
 The translation by the ICRC. The original text in French read µ/¶DXWRULWpGXSRXYRLUOpJDOpWDQWVXVSHQGXH
HWD\DQWSDVVpGHIDLWHQWUHOHVPDLQVGHO¶RFFXSDQW«¶ 
121
 The translation by the ICRC. The original text in French mentioned µpWDQWVXVSHQGXHHW¶ 
122
 This was proposed by Beernaert (Belgium):  James Brown Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace 
Conference, The Translation of the Official Texts, The Conference of 1899, (New York:  Oxford University 
press, 1920) at 512. 
123
 Conférence International de la Paix; La Haye, 18 Mai-29 Juillet, 1899, 1899, Part I, p. 119; Scott, ibid. 
124
 See Giladi (2012), supra n. 21, at 114 (arguing that for Francis Lieber, the transient character of occupation 
GLGQRWVXJJHVWDQ\OLPLWDWLRQRQWKHRFFXS\LQJSRZHU¶VDXWKRULW\ 
125
 $ORQJWKLVOLQH/RHQLQJDVVHUWHGWKDWµ[w]hen the occupation prolongs, the occupant will also have to 
DFFRPPRGDWHWKHSUHVVLQJQHHGVRIWKHSRSXODWLRQ¶/RHQLQJsupra n. 29, at 634. In the present-day context, 
VHH,&5&¶V5HSRUWExpert Meeting on Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory 
DWµ,QIDFW WKHGXUDWLRQRIWKHRFFXSDWLRQZDVDIDFWRUWKDWFRXOGOHDGWRWUDQVIRUPDWLRQVDQG




conferral only of the limited degree of power upon the occupier may be read as an indicator 
for the presumably interim nature of occupation. 
 
6.2. The Travaux Préparatoires of the Brussels Declaration and the Limited Power to 
be Exercised by the Occupying Power 
With respect to Article 3 of the Brussels Declaration, it should be noted that its original 
text126 had expressly recognized that as a general rule, the occupying power was invested 
with broad or even almost unencumbered latitudes to alter the local laws. According to this 
ILUVWGUDIWWH[Wµ[t]he enemy that occupies a territory may, according to the exigencies of 
the war and in view of the public interest, either maintain the binding force of the laws that 
were in effect in time of peace, RU PRGLI\ WKHP LQ SDUW RU VXVSHQG WKHP HQWLUHO\¶.127 
However, following drastic changes introduced at the hands of both the President and the 
Commission,128 WKHRFFXSDQW¶VVXFKSRZHUWRPRGLI\WKHORFDOODZVZDVWUDQVIRUPHGLQWR
the exception that could be exercised only in case of necessity. 129  Article 3 came to 
highlight instead the principle of preserving local laws and the ban on modifying them.130  
To obtain more insight into such drastic changes, it is crucial to investigate how this came 
about in the drafting process. At Brussels, by the proposal of Baron Jomini (Russia), Article 
2 of the first draft text was split131 into two provisions:  (1) Article 2, which allowed an 
occupying power to suspend the local authority and to take all measures to restore and 
HQVXUHµO¶RUGUHHW ODYLHSXEOLTXH¶DQG$UWLFOHWKDW while proclaiming the idea of 
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 The very first draft text was proposed by Russia and initially numbered as Article 2. 
127
 The original French text read that µ/¶HQQHPLTXLRFFXSHXQWHUULWRLUHSHXWVHORQOHVH[LJHQFHVGHODJXHUUH
HWHQYXHGHO¶LQWpUrWSXEOLFVRLWPDLQWHQLUODIRUFHREOLJDWRLUHGHVORLVTXLpWDLHQWHQYLJXHUHQWHPSVGHSDL[
VRLWOHVPRGLILHUHQSDUWLHVRLWOHVVXVSHQGUHHQWLqUHPHQW¶ :  MiQLVWqUHGHV$IIDLUHVƜWUDQJqUHVsupra n. 40, 
at 9, emphasis added, translation by the present author. 
$UWLFOH  RI WKH RULJLQDO 5XVVLDQ GUDIW WH[W UHDG WKDW µO¶HQQHPL TXL RFFXSH XQ WHUULWRLUH SHXW VHORQ OHV
H[LJHQFHVGHODJXHUUHHWHQYXHGHO¶LQWpUrWSXEOLF¶VRLWPDLQWHQLUODIRUFHREOLJDWRLUHGHVORLVTXLpWDLHQWHQ
viguer en temps de paix, soit les modifier en partie, soit les suspendre HQWLqUHPHQW¶µ7KHHQHP\WKDWRFFXSLHV
a territory can, according to the exigencies of the war and in view of the public interest, either maintain the 
PDQGDWRU\IRUFHRIWKHODZWKDWZDVLQHIIHFWLQWLPHRISHDFHPRGLI\WKHPLQSDUWRUVXVSHQGWKHPHQWLUHO\¶
translation by the present author). 
128
 As a first step of change, the President of the Conference, Baron Jomini (Russia), revised a draft text in 
the plenary session, introducing, for the first time, a provision (new Article 1) that defined what was an 
µRFFXSLHGWHUULWRU\¶0LQLVWqUHGHV$IIDLUHVƜWUDQJqUHV supra n. 40, at 277 (new draft text proposed by the 
President in the plenary session on 5 August 1874). 
129
 $UWLFOHRI WKHGUDIW WH[WSURSRVHGE\ WKH3UHVLGHQWRQ$XJXVWSURYLGHG WKDW µ¬FHWHIIHW LO
maintient les lois qui étaient en viguer dans le pays en temps de paix, et ne les modifie, ne les suspend ou ne 
les remplace que V¶LO\HVWREOLJp¶µ7RWKLVHIIHFWVKH>WKHHQHP\RFFXSDQW@PDLQWDLQVWKHODZVWKDWZHUHLQ
force in the country in time of peace, and modifies, suspends or replaces them only where it is obliged to do 
VR¶0LQLVWqUHGHV$IIDLUHVƜWUDQJqUHVsupra n. 106, at 284 (translation by the present author). The text was 
VOLJKWO\FKDQJHGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQZLWKWKHODVWSKUDVHµTXHV¶LO\HVWREOLJp¶UHSODFHGE\WKHZRUGVµTXHVL
LO\DQpFpVVLWp¶  ibid., at 285-7KHILQDOZRUGLQJUHYHUWHGWRWKHSKUDVHµTXHV¶LO\HVWREOLJp¶ZKLOH
changing the tense from the present to future:  ibid., at 288 and 297. 
130
 Ibid., at 239 (Baron Blanc of Italy, expressing this view as personal capacity). 
131
 This process was to be reversed at the subsequent Hague Conference (1899) to form one united provision 




preserving the local laws, made the possibility of modifying, suspending or replacing local 
laws the exception that could be allowed only in case of necessity.132 Article 3 stipulated 
WKDWµ[w]ith this object he shall maintain the laws which were in force in the country in time 
RISHDFHDQGVKDOOQRWPRGLI\VXVSHQGRUUHSODFHWKHPXQOHVVQHFHVVDU\¶133 Hence, this 
provision gravitated toward emphasizing the limited and exceptional nature of the 
legislative power of the occupant. It was the German delegation that motioned to amend 
the original text that had recognised a wide power of modifying local laws by changing the 
SKUDVHµHLWKHUPRGLI\WKHPLQSDUWRUVXVSHQGWKHPHQWLUHO\¶134 He proposed that this 
wording be substituted b\WKHSKUDVHWKDWZRXOGFRQILQHWKHRFFXSLHU¶VOHJLVODWLYHSRZHU
RQO\WRWKHFDVHRIQHFHVVLW\µQHLWKHUPRGLI\WKHPQRUVXVSHQGWKHPQRUUHSODFHWKHP
H[FHSWLQFDVHRIQHFHVVLW\¶135 The result of this amendment was to turn around the whole 
interpretive dynamic of this provision. As a result of such alterations, in the final draft text 
WKH RFFXS\LQJ SRZHU¶V SRVVLELOLW\ RI DVVXPLQJ D ZLGH UDQJH RI OHJLVODWLYH DQG
administrative powers was posited only as an exception.  
6.3. The Doctrines on the Correlation between the Limited Degree of Power 
Conferred upon the Occupying Power and the Temporary Nature of Occupation  
Writing in 1872, two years before the Brussels Declaration, Loening suggested that the 
scope and kind of powers to be wielded by an occupying power should depend on the 
length of occupation.136 Many scholars of the laws of war in the period between the late 
                                                 
 
132
 0LQLVWqUHGHV$IIDLUHVƜWUDQJqUHVsupra n. 40, at 9, 110, 239, 277, 284, 288 and 297. As explained in the 
previous sub-sections, after some further changes were introduced into the text of Article 2, the final version 
UHDGVWKDWµ/¶DXWRULWpGXSRXYRLUOpJDOpWDQWVXVSHQGXHHWD\DQWSDVVVpHGHIDLWHQWUHOHVPDLQVGHR¶RFFXSDQW
celui-ci prendra toutes les mesures qui dépendent dHOXLHQYXHGHUpWDEOLUHWG¶DVVXUHUDXWDQWTX¶LOHVWSRVVLEOH
O¶RUGUHHWODYLHSXEOLTXH¶µThe authority of the legitimate Power being suspended and having in fact passed 
into the hands of the occupants, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far 
DVSRVVLEOHSXEOLFRUGHUDQGVDIHW\¶ibid., at 297, English translation by the ICRC. 
133
 The original French text proclaimed that µ¬FHWHIIHWLOPDLQWLHQGUDOHVORLVTXLpWDLHQWHQYLJXHUGDQVOH
pays en temps de paixHWQH OHVPRGLILHUQH OHVVXVSHQGUDRXQH OHV UHPSODFHUDTXH V¶LO\DQpFHVVLWp¶ :  
English translation by the ICRC). 
134
  7KHRULJLQDO)UHQFKZRUGLQJUHDGµVRLWOHVPRGLILHUHQSDUWLHVRLWOHVVXVSHQGUHHQWLqUHPHQW¶WUDQVODWLRQ
by the present author. 
135
 7KHRULJLQDO)UHQFKYHUVLRQUHDGµQHOHVPRGLILHUQHOHVVXVSHQGUDRXQHOHVUHPSODFHUDTX¶HQFDVGH
nécessitp¶:  0LQLVWqUHGHV$IIDLUHVƜWUDQJqUHVsupra n. 40, at 110. This proposal was supported by Mr de 
Lansberge (the Netherlands) and Colonel Count Lanza (Italy):  ibid., at 110-111. 
136
 On this, see Loening, supra n. 29DWVWDWLQJWKDWLQFDVHRIµVKRUWRFFXSDWLRQ¶WKHRFFXS\LQJSRZHU
had to take measures relating to the safety of the occupation army while in FDVHRIµDORQJRFFXSDWLRQ¶LWV
power could turn to general legislation). The relevant part of his original text is worthy of citation here: 
 
L'occupation n'est-elle que passagère, de courte durée, LO >O¶HQQHPL@ VH FRQWHQWHUD GH SUHQGUH OHV




vaincu étant suspendu et toute tentative faite pour l'exercer étant menacée de peine, l'ennemi occupant doit, 
autant que le permettent la guerre et ses nécessités, compenser cet état de choses. Il exerce, bien que ce ne 
soit qu'à titre provisoire, les droits éminents de l'État, il perçoit les impôts, il est donc tenu par contre de 




nineteenth century and early twentieth century seemed to emphasize the correlation 
between the relatively limited degree of power bestowed upon the occupant and the 
provisional nature of occupation.137  They seemed to read the generally circumscribed 
QDWXUHRIWKHRFFXSLHU¶VSRZHUDVDQLQGLFDWLRQIRUWKHWUDQVLHQWQDWXUHRILWVFRQWURO In 
1890, Hall contended that µ«WKHLQYDGHUKDYLQJRQO\DULJKWWRVXFKFRQWURODVLVQHFHVVDU\
for his safety and the success of his operations, must use his power within the limits defined 
by the fundamental notion of occupation, and with due reference to its transient 
FKDUDFWHU¶.138  Similarly, according to Graber (1949), µ[t]he modern law of belligerent 
occupation is anchored in the concept that occupation differs in its nature and legal 
FRQVHTXHQFHV IURP FRQTXHVW « 6KH DGGHG WKDW µWhe early definition of the modern 
concept of occupation are [sic] chiefly concerned with the main aspects of this difference, 
namely the temporary nature of belligerent occupation as contrasted with the permanency 
of conquest, and the limited, rather than the full powers which belligerent occupation 
entDLOVIRUWKHRFFXSDQW¶139 
 
6.4. Minority of µ&ODVVLF¶6FKRODUO\2SLQLRQV± the Extensive Power of the Occupant 
and the Possibility of Prolonged Occupation 
                                                 
 
(When the occupation is only temporary, of short duration, the enemy is satisfied to make the arrangements 
necessitated by the exigencies of the war and by its own security. When the occupation prolongs, the 
RFFXSDQWZLOODOVRKDYHWRDFFRPPRGDWHWKHSUHVVLQJQHHGVRIWKHSRSXODWLRQ«7KHSRZHURIWKH6WDWH
vanquished was suspended and all the attempt to exercise it was threatened with punishment, the enemy 
occupant must compensate for that state of affairs, as long as the war and its necessity allows it. The 
occupant can exercise, though only provisionally, the eminent rights of the state, collects the taxes, and s/he 
is by contrast, obliged to fill the duties inherent in those rights). 
 
Emphasis added; translation by the present author. 
137
 Rolin-Jaequemyns, supra n. 48, at 660-666, 675-685, 690-693. See also Calvo, supra n. 39, at 212, para. 
2166; and Loening, supra n. 29, at 626-634, 650. For the argument that while occupation was a temporary 
state of affairs, the occupier had the extensive right to change the local laws, see Halleck, supra n. 27, at 775-
776 and 781. He observed that: 
The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force 
during military occupation, except so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of the conqueror. 
Important changes of this kind are seldom made, as the conqueror has no interest in interfering with the 
municipal laws of the country which he holds by the temporary rights of military occupation. He 
nevertheless has all the powers of a de facto government, and can, at his pleasure, either change the existing 
laws, or make new ones. Such changes, however, are, in general, only of a temporary character, and end 
ZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQWZKLFKPDGHWKHP«1HLWKHUWKHFLYLOQRUWKHFULPLQDOMXULVGLFWLRQRIWKHFRQTXHULQJ
state is considered, in international law, as extending over the conquered territory during military 
occupation.  
Ibid., at 781, para. 5, emphasis added. 
138
 Hall, supra n. 8, at 470, para. 155, emphasis added. See also Oppenheim (1917), supra n. 9, at 364. 
139




Some American µclassic¶ writings in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth 
century suggested the extensive power of the occupant and a possibility of occupation of 
relatively lengthy duration. :KHDWRQ¶VWUHDWLVHSXEOLVKHGGXULQJWKH$PHULFDQ&LYLO:DU
admitted the µLQGHILQLWH¶QDWXUHRIEHOOLJHUHQWRFFXSDWLRQHYHQDIWHUILJKWLQJFHDVHGOne 
caveat is that this was contemplated only so long as the legal state of war continued.140 
Accordingly, Wheaton envisaged post-hostilities occupation which may have been 
protracted until the final status of the occupied territory was settled by an agreement (such 
as a treaty of peace). Needless WRVD\WKHDGMHFWLYHµLQGHILQLWH¶ZDVQRWV\QRQ\PRXVZLWK
WKH TXDOLILHU µSHUPDQHQW¶ :KHDWRQ PDGH SODLQ WKDW WKH RFFXS\LQJ SRZHU ZRXOG µQRW 
become the permanent FLYLOVRYHUHLJQRIWKHFRXQWU\¶141 In his view, the occupying power 
would not acquire any abiding title to the immovable property.142 Overall, it is unclear if 
Wheaton, even when conceding a possibility of a longer occupation of territory of a 
sovereign state, envisaged the protracted kind that would endure for decades after ceasefire. 
  
One may surmise that :KHDWRQ¶V inclination toward relatively long-spanned occupation 
may be coterminous with the influential American doctrine that HQGRUVHGDQRFFXSLHU¶V
wide range of powers. Lieber implicitly recognized the exceptional possibility of annexing 
an occupied land even prior to the conclusion of peace.143 In his view, the occupant was 
JUDQWHGWKHµIXOOSRZHU¶LQFDVHRIPLOLWDU\QHFessity.144 Akin to Lieber, Hall145 tinkered 
with the thesis that a large scope of powers might be reserved to the occupying power. 
Their views went further than what was contemplated by contemporary scholars in Europe. 
For instance, Bluntschli was disposed to qualify the ambit of the war-authority of the 
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 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 8th edition by Richard Henry Dana Jr, (London: Sampson 
Low, 1866), at Part IV, para. 347, at pp. 436-$FFRUGLQJWRKLPµ%HOOLJHUHQWRFFXSDWLRQLPSOLHVDILUP
possession, so that the occupying power can execute its will either by force or by acquiescence of the people, 
and for an indefinite future, subject only to the chances of war. On the other hand, it implies that the status 
RIZDUFRQWLQXHVEHWZHHQWKHFRXQWULHVZKHWKHUILJKWLQJKDVFHDVHGRUQRW«¶:  ibid., at 436, emphasis added.  
141
 Ibid., at 436, emphasis added. 
142
 Ibid., at 437-438. 
143
 Article 33 of the /LHEHU&RGHSURFODLPVWKDWµ[i]t is no longer considered lawful -on the contrary, it is held 
to be a serious breach of the law of war -to force the subjects of the enemy into the service of the victorious 
government, except the latter should proclaim, after a fair and complete conquest of the hostile country or 
district, that it is resolved to keep the country, district, or place permanently as its own and make it a portion 
oILWVRZQFRXQWU\¶ See Graber, supra QDWH[SODLQLQJWKDW$UWLFOHZDVGUDIWHGE\/LHEHUµZLWK
WKH&LYLO:DULQPLQG¶ 
144
 This can be inferred from the reading of Articles 1 and 2 of the Code.  See also Bluntschli, supra n. 57, at 
p. 8, para. 36 and at p. 9, para. 40. 
145
 Hall observed that the rights which the occupier possessed over the inhabitants of the occupied territory 
LQFOXGHGWKHµgeneral right to do whatever acts DUHQHFHVVDU\IRUWKHSURVHFXWLRQRIKLVZDU¶DQGWKDWZLWK
WKHVFRSHRIVXFKULJKWVGHOLPLWHGRQO\E\WKHDPELJXRXVQRWLRQRIPLOLWDU\QHFHVVLW\µWKHULJKWVDFTXLUHGE\
an invader in effect amount to the momentary possession of all ultimate legislative DQGH[HFXWLYHSRZHU¶. He 
DGGVWKDWµ[o]n occupying a country an invader at once invests himself with absolute authority, and the fact 
of occupation draws with it as of course the substitution of his will for previously existing law whenever such 




RFFXSLHUE\µthe need of continuation of war, or by the need of occupied area or of the 
SRSXODWLRQ¶146 It is plausible that many American writers were influenced by (or purported 
to give legitimacy to) the previous practice of the United States during the Anglo-American 
War (War of 1812, 1812-1815) 147  and the Mexican American War  (or American 
Intervention in Mexico, 1846-48).148 Even after the Brussels Conference, the 8QLWHG6WDWHV¶ 
practice, markedly different from the European views, conferred an avowedly wide range 
of powers upon an occupying power. 149  This can be discerned in relation to the 
annexationist practice of the United States during the Spanish-American War (1898).150  
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 %OXQWVFKOL H[SODLQHG WKDW µ'LH .ULHJVJHZDOW NDQQ DOOJHPHLQH 9HURUGXQXQJHQ HUODVVHQ (LQULFKWXQJHQ
treffen, Polizeigewalt und Steurhoheit ausüben, so weit solches durch das Bedürfnis der Kriegsführung 
geboten ist, oder durch die Bedürfnisse der besetzten Gebiete und seiner Bewohner erfordert wird. µ7KHZDU-
authority can proclaim general directives, set up institutions, exercise the police authority and tax sovereignty, 
insofar as this is demanded by the need of continuation of war, or by the need of occupied area or of the 
SRSXODWLRQ¶WUDQVODWLRQE\WKHSUHVHQWDXWKRUBluntschli, supra n. 57, at 8, para. 36. 
147
 See United States v. Rice, 4 Wheaton 254, 1819 (relating to the city of Castine occupied by the British in 
the war of 1812). Justice Story held that: 
 
By the conquest and military occupation of Castine the enemy acquired that firm possession which enabled 
him to exercise the fullest right of sovereignty over that place. The sovereignty of the United States over 
the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully 
enforced there or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conqueror. By the 
surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British government, and were bound 
by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. 
 
Emphasis added. See also The Foltina, 'RGVRQµ1RSRLQWLVPRUHFOHDrly settled in courts of 
FRPPRQODZWKDQWKDWDFRQTXHUHGWHUULWRU\IRUPVLPPHGLDWHO\SDUWRIWKH.LQJ¶VGRPLQLRQV¶ 
148
 See the statement of President Polk addressed to the House of Representatives on 24 July 1848: 
 
In prosecuting a foreign war thus duly dHFODUHGE\&RQJUHVVZHKDYHWKHULJKWE\µFRQTXHVWDQGPLOLWDU\







or allegiance or sovereignty there can be no claim to obeGLHQFH¶7KHVHDUHZHOO-established principles of 
the laws of war, as recognized and practiced by civilized nations, and they have been sanctioned by the 
highest judicial tribunal of our own country. 
 
James D. Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, Vol. IV, 
(Washington D.C.:  The Government Printing Office, 1897), 595. See also Fleming et al. v. Page, 1 January 
1850, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, at 615 (per &KLHI-XVWLFH7DQH\µE\WKHODZV and usages of nations, conquest 
LVDYDOLGWLWOHZKLOHWKHYLFWRUPDLQWDLQVWKHH[FOXVLYHSRVVHVVLRQRIWKHFRQTXHUHGFRXQWU\¶ 
149
 According to Benvenisti, the Americans, when expanding the western frontier territories, closely followed 
the British practLFH µZKLFKGLGQRWGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQRFFXSDWLRQDQGFRQTXHVW¶ LQQRQ-Western world, 
µZKHUHE\PHUHRFFXSDWLRQZDVDQHIIHFWLYHZD\RIH[SDQGLQJLWVGRPLQLRQWRRFFXSLHGWHUULWRULHVDQGWKHLU
LQKDELWDQWV¶%HQYHQLVWLsupra n. 31, at 635-636. See also ibid., at 639. 
150
 See the Executive Order addressed to The Secretary of War on 19 May 1898. In this, President McKinley 





7. Temporariness of Occupation and Prolonged Occupation in the Travaux 
Préparatoires of the GCIV  
7.1. Overview:  The Relevance of Article 6(3) GCIV to the Question of Prolonged 
Occupation 
+DYLQJREWDLQHGLQVLJKWVLQWRKRZWKHGUDIWHUVRIWKHµFODVVLF¶WH[WVRIWKHODZs of war and 
the doctrinal discourses in the corresponding period (1863-1949) conceived the temporal 
aspect of the legal regime of occupation, the examinations now turn to the question of 
prolonged occupation in the mind of the framers of modern IHL:  the GCIV and the API. 
Starting with the GCIV, this section will focus on the draft records of the GCIV (1949), 
especially with respect to Article 4 of the Stockholm draft text of the GCIV151 (which 
corresponded to Article 6 GCIV). A closer perusal of the draft records reveals that the 
evidence for recognizing the possibility of decades-long protracted occupation is minimal 
and, at best, inconclusive.152 
  
7.2. Interpretation of Article 6(3) GCIV in Accordance with the General Rule of 
Interpretation 
As succinctly discussed in Section 4 above, Article 6(3) GCIV contains the so-called µone-
year rule¶, which delimits the temporal span of applicability of the GCIV (save for the core 
forty-three provisions expressly spelt out). Evidently, Article 6(3) GCIV contains an 
important exception that is applicable to the post-belligerent phase, namely what Dinstein 
                                                 
 
 
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the 
political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private 
rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in 
force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by 
the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force 
and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. 
 
Emphasis added. See also Benvenisti (2008), supra n. 31, at 638 (discussing how the United States doctrine 
allowed the occupation and the use of  force to acquire sovereign title over the territory through a sovereign 
act, such as annexation or incorporation, even though this, failing an act of the Cognree, still had yet to make 
the territory in qustion subject to the United States law). See also Benvenisti, ibid., at 641. 
151
 Article 4 of the Stockholm draft text, which was approved by the XVIIth International Red Cross 
&RQIHUHQFHDW6WRFNKROPZDVHQWLWOHGµEHJLQQLQJDQGHQGRIDSSOLFDWLRQ¶,WGLGQRWFRQWDLQWKHµRQH-year 
UXOH¶DVWKLVZDVLQWURGXFHGDWWKHVXEVHTXHQW*HQHYD&RQIHUHQce. Article 4 read that: 
 
The present Convention shall apply from the outset of any conflict covered by Article 2. The application 
thereof shall cease on the close of hostilities or of occupation, except as regards protected persons whose 
release, repatriation or re-establishment may take place subsequently and who, until such operations are 
terminated, shall continue to benefit by the present Convention. 
 
Final Record, ibid, Vol. I, at 114. 
152
 See, e.g., ICRC, Report on the Work of the Conference of Government Experts for the Study of the 
Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, Geneva, April 14-26, 1947, (Geneva:  ICRC, 1947); and the 
Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 (hereinafter referred to as Final Record), 




FDOOV µSRVW-EHOOLJHUHQW RFFXSDWLRQ¶153 RU µSRVW-KRVWLOLWLHV EHOOLJHUHQW RFFXSDWLRQ¶154 This 
exception relates to forty-WKUHH SURYLVLRQV WKDW DUH FRQVLGHUHG WR EH µKDUG FRUH¶ DQG RI
fundamental importance for the occupied population.155 These provisions retain validity 
throughout the duration of occupation.156 Still, with regard to Part III of GCIV, which 
specifically addresses occupation, only 23 out of its 32 provisions will outlast the passage 
of one year after the general close of military operations and continue to apply in the entire 
phase of post-belligerent occupation.  
 
7KHWHUPµWKHJHQHUDOFORVHRIPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQV¶UDLVHVsome interpretative issues. One 
immediate question may be the meaning of WKH FRQFHSW µPLOLWDU\ RSHUDWLRQV¶. It seems 
widely recognized that this concept is broader than that of µactive KRVWLOLWLHV¶used in Article 
118 GCIII. 157  Along this line, some authors consider the former concept sufficiently 
broadly to include even the construction of a wall in occupied territories.158 Nevertheless, 
such understanding was not necessarily shared in the past. The draft records of the 1949 
Geneva Conference reveal that some delegates conflated the two concepts µPLOLWDU\
RSHUDWLRQV¶DQGµDFWLYHKRVWLOLWLHV¶ When evaluating the temporal juncture from which the 
one year should run under Article 6(3) GCIV, several delegates equated the close of 
hostilities to the conclusion of military operations.159 
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 Dinstein (1998), supra n. 38, at 42-+HH[SODLQVWKDWµ[w]hen the war has taken place and is terminated 
by a peace treaty - or by any other arrangement embedded in consent ± an occupation prolonged beyond the 
end of the war cannot erase its origin which were non-pacific. The best term in the opinion of the present 
ZULWHULV³SRVW-EHOOLJHUHQWRFFXSDWLRQ´¶LELGDW 
154
 Dinstein (2009), supra n. 81, at 280-283, paras 674-680. 
155
 <RUDP'LQVWHLQµ$XWRQRP\DQG/HJDO6WDWXV$5HMRLQGHU¶Security Dialogue 185, at 188; 
and Knut Dörmann and Hans-3HWHU*DVVHU µ3URWHFWLRQRI WKH &LYLOLDQ3RSXODWLRQ¶ LQ 'LHWHU)OHFN The 
Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 3rd ed., (Oxford University Press, 2013), para. 537. 
156
 After one-year time span, occupation draws to a close in various forms or patterns. For the purpose of the 
non-application of those 43 fundamental provisions, it does not matter if a handover of governmental 
authority may take place in one single day by an official and solemn proclamation, or by the progressive 
phrasing out of foreign forces. 
157
 &OHDUO\ WKHFRLQDJHµDFWLYHKRVWLOLWLHV¶ LVPXFKQDUURZHU WKDQ WKH concept of µKRVWLOLWLHV¶ The ,&5&¶V
Commentary to APs states that: 
 
7KHJHQHUDOFORVHRIPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVPD\RFFXUDIWHUWKHµFHVVDWLRQRIDFWLYHKRVWLOLWLHV¶UHIHUUHGWRLQ
Article 118 of the Third Convention: although a ceasefire, even a tacit ceasefire, may be sufficient for that 
Convention, military operations can often continue after such a ceasefire, even without confrontations. 
Whatever the moment of the general close of military operations, repercussions of the conflict may continue 
to affect some persons who will be dealt with below. 
 
,&5&¶V&Rmmentary to APs at 68, para. 153. 
158
 Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli, supra n. 39, at 595; Julia Grignon, /¶DSSOLFDELOLWpWHPSRUHOOHGXGURLW
international humanitaire, (Zurich:  Schulthess, 2014), at 315. Elsewhere, Grignon ponders over the question 
whether a manoeuvre deployed by a foreign army to effectuate the instance of occupation without armed 
resistance in a manner described in Article 2(2) common to the GCs may or may not constitute military 
operations:  ibid., at 322-323. 
159






Another TXHVWLRQ WKDW KDV UDLVHG PXFK RI GRFWULQDO FRQWURYHUV\ LV LI WKH WHUP µPLOLWDU\
RSHUDWLRQV¶points to those that temporarily and causally precede the occupation in question. 
This narrow reading is precisely the one adopted by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion in 
Wall. In that case, the Court held that Article 6(3) GCIV set the one-year rule running from 
µWKH JHQHUDO FORVH RI PLOLWDU\ RSHUDWLRQV OHDGLQJ WR WKH RFFXSDWLRQ¶ 160  Yet, as critics 
claim, 161  the qualifying words µOHDGLQJ WR WKH RFFXSDWLRQ¶ ZKLFK shows a causal 
connection, were absent under Article 6(3) GCIV but appended by the Court.162   
 
One may ask if Article 6(3) GCIV is tailored only to historical circumstances of the Allied 
post-hostilities belligerent occupation in Germany, Austria and the American occupation 
of Japan.163  If an answer to this question is in the affirmative, the relevance of that 
paragraph to other instances of occupation in general might be discounted. Yet, the 
ordinary meaning of Article 6(3) GCIV makes it unmistakably clear that its scope of 
application ratione materiae and ratione loci is purported to be general. Accordingly, by 
delimiting the temporal parameters of many provisions, Article 6(3) GCIV is marked off 
                                                 
 
DGGLQJWKDWµ>D@QRFFXSDWLRQZKLFKODVWHGEH\RQGWKHGDWHRIFHVVDWLRQRIKRVWLOLWLHVRQO\HQWDLOHGREOLJDWLRQV
which were to be lifted prRJUHVVLYHO\DVDQGZKHQWKHORFDODXWKRULW\WRRNRYHUDGPLQLVWUDWLYHSRZHUV¶ibid., 
at 625. Later, the Report of the Rapporteur of Committee III to the Plenary Assembly explained that the text 
of Article 4 of the Stockholm Draft was amended to use the pKUDVHµJHQHUDOFRQFOXVLRQRIPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQV¶
LQVWHDGRIWKHZRUGVµFRQFOXVLRQRIKRVWLOLWLHV¶ZLWKDYLHZWRDYRLGLQJDQ\FRQIXVLRQLQFRXQWULHVVXFKDV
)UDQFH ZKHUHXQGHUQDWLRQDO OHJLVODWLRQ µWKH FRQFOXVLRQRIKRVWLOLWLHV¶ ZDVGHWHUPLQHGE\GHFUHH, which 
would repeal all internal war legislation and restore peacetime legislation:  ibid., at 815. The Rapporteur 
XQGHUVWRRGWKHQRWLRQµPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQV¶LQDPDQQHUWKDWwas very narrow and synonymous to the notion 
of µDFWLYHKRVWLOLWLHV¶. He stated WKDWµWKHJHQHUDOFRQFOXVLRQRIPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVPHDQVZKHQWKHODVWVKRW
KDVEHHQILUHG¶6HHDOVRWKHYLHZVH[SUHVVHGE\WKH0RQDFRGHOHJDWLRQDQGWKH&KDLUSHUVRQWKH)UHQFK
delegate) at the Third Meeting:  ibid., at 624. 
160
 The Court held that: 
 
A distinction is also made in the Fourth Geneva Convention between provisions applying during military 
operations leading to occupation and those that remain applicable throughout the entire period of 
RFFXSDWLRQ«6LQFHWKHPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVOHDGLQJWRWhe occupation of the West Bank in 1967 ended a 
long time ago, only those Articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention referred to in Article 6, paragraph 3, 
remain applicable in that occupied territory. 
 
ICJ, Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (Wall Advisory Opinion), 9 July 2004, para. 125. See also Dinstein (1998), supra n. 38, at 41-44 
DUJXLQJWKDWRQO\WKH,VUDHOLRFFXSDWLRQRI*RODQ+HLJKWVFRQVWLWXWHGµEHOOLJHUHQW¶RFFXSDWLRQLQVWULFW sense, 
while the nature of occupation of the both West Bank and the Gaza Strip has been transformed by various 
agreements). 
161
 $UGL,PVHLVµ&ULWLFDO5HIOHFWLRQVRQWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQLWDULDQ$VSHFWVRIWKH,&- Wall Advisory 
2SLQLRQ¶$-,/2, at 106; Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michaeli, supra n. 39, at 595-596 (However, 
WKHSUHVHQWZULWHUGLVDJUHHVRYHUWKHLUZLGHULQWHUSUHWDWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKWKHWHUPµPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQ¶
is understood as encompassing all µWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVVXUURXQGLQJWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHZDOO¶See also 
Final Record, supra n. 61, Vol. II-A, at 623-25;  
162 Wall Advisory Opinion, supra n. 77, para. 125. See also ibidSDUDµWKHJHQHUDOFORVHRIPLOLWDU\
RSHUDWLRQVWKDWOHGWRWKHLURFFXSDWLRQ¶6HH%HQ-Naftali, Gross and Michaeli, supra n. 39, at 595-6. 
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from the Hague Regulations. As discussed above, the latter do not set any temporal limit 
on the applicability of their rules on occupation.164 
  
7.3. Continued Applicability of the Law of Occupation to Occupied Territory Where 
There is no Armed Resistance  
According to 3LFWHW¶V &RPPHQWDU\ (1958), Article 6(3) GCIV, when regulating the 
temporal ambit of the GCIV, LVµGHOLEHUDWH¶in omitting to refer to one situation of occupied 
territory covered by Article 2(2) common to the GCs, namely, the territory that has fallen 
into occupation where an occupant does not encounter any armed resistance, state of war 
or armed conflict (hence, absence of any hostilities). 165  In such situations, 3LFWHW¶V
Commentary considers WKDWWKHEDVLVIRUWKHµRQH-\HDUUXOH¶LVPRRW. Hence, contrary to the 
temporal scope of application of most provisions of the GCIV, µWKH&RQYHQWLRQwill be 
fully applicable« VRORQJDVWKHRFFXSDWLRQODVWV¶166 On this reading, it can be suggested 
that the GCIV implicitly recognizes long-spanning occupation in the cases µZKHUHWKHUH
KDV EHHQ QR PLOLWDU\ UHVLVWDQFH QR VWDWH RI ZDU DQG QR DUPHG FRQIOLFW¶, as covered by 
common Article 2(2) GCs.167  
 
In those situations, according to 3LFWHW¶V Commentary, there is no doubt about the 
applicability of the GCIV.168 The continued validity of the GCIV in such types of occupied 
WHUULWRU\PD\EHDSWO\GHSLFWHGDVµWKHH[FHSWLRQWRWKHH[FHSWLRQ¶RIWKHRQH-year rule laid 
down in Article 6(3) GCIV.169  
 
As an alternative, in such instances of occupation where an occupying power has not met 
with any armed resistance, it may be suggested that the act of forcible incorporation and 
occupation itself should be considered a µmilitary operation¶ in the sense of IHL.170 On this 
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 7KLVLVWUXHHYHQWKRXJK$UWLFOH*&,9XQGHUVFRUHVWKHµVXSSOHPHQWDU\¶nature of the GCIV in relation 
to Section III of the Hague Regulations that governs the occupied territory. At the Diplomatic Conference 
(1949), some influential delegates insisted on the meaning of occupation laid down by the Hague 
Regulations:  Final Record, Vol. II-A, at 624-625 (United Kingdom and Italy). The United Kingdom delegate 
even stressed that any new rule under GCIV that would be inconsistent with the rules of occupation under 
the Hague Regulations was unacceptable to his delegation:  ibid., at 775-776. 
165
 3LFWHW¶V&RPPHQWDU\WR*&,9at 63. 
166
 Ibid. The Commentary adds that in the absence of a political act, such as the annexation of the territory or 
its incorporation in a federation, recognizHG E\ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\ µWKH SURYLVLRQV RI the 
&RQYHQWLRQPXVWFRQWLQXHWREHDSSOLHG¶6WLOOLWPD\EHDUJXHGWKDWZKDW3LFWHW¶V&RPPHQWDU\is purported 
to suggest is to highlight the protection of the civilian population under occupation (whose meaning is 
understood in tune with common Article 2 GCs as encompassing the situation where there is no armed 
resistance), rather than to address the specific question of the temporal span of occupation.  
167
 Ibid. Still, it quickly adds that because of the termination of hostilities, there is no justification for 
maintaining stringent measures against the civilian population:  ibid. 
168
 Ibid (adding that the exception to this may arise in the case of any political act recognized by the 
international community, such as the annexation of the territory or its incorporation in a federation). 
169
 Grigon, supra n. at 322. 
170
 For this view, see Robert Kolb and Silvain Vité, /H GURLW GH O¶RFFXSDWLRQ PLOLWDLUH  SHUVSHFWLYHV




reading, in line with Article 6(3) GCIV, the µone-year rule¶ will duly apply after the 
termination of the µmilitary operation¶ (that is, taking control over a foreign territory).171  
 
7.4. The Travaux Préparatoires of Article 6(3) GCIV and Their Implications on 
Prolonged Occupation 
At the Diplomatic Conference at Geneva (1949), Article 4 of the Stockholm Draft provided 
the basis for hammering out the text of Article 6 GCIV. The second sentence of this draft 
SURYLVLRQUHDGWKDW µ[t]he application thereof shall cease on the close of hostilities or of 
occupation, except as regards protected persons whose release, repatriation or re-
establishment may take place subsequently and who, until such operations are terminated, 
VKDOOFRQWLQXHWREHQHILWE\WKHSUHVHQW&RQYHQWLRQ¶ 
 
When examining Article 4 of the Stockholm Civilians Draft, some delegates contemplated 
a relatively protracted case of occupation. StiOOZKLOHUHIHUULQJH[SUHVVO\WRµDSURORQJHG
PLOLWDU\RFFXSDWLRQ¶WKH8nited States delegate was swift in proclaiming that a long-term 
SDWWHUQ RI RFFXSDWLRQ KDG WR EH DWWHQGHG E\ µD SURJUHVVLYH UHWXUQ RI JRYHUQPHQWDO
UHVSRQVLELOLW\WRORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶172 Other delegates were reluctant to endorse prolonged 
occupation. They proposed to set a time limit on the applicability of the draft text of the 
*&,97KH\IHDUHGWKDWRWKHUZLVHRFFXSDWLRQPLJKWHODSVHIRUDµFRQVLGHUDEOHWLPH¶RU
HYHQ µLQGHILQLWHO\¶ LQ a post-belligerent situation. 173  They highlighted the need to 
enumerate which obligations should cease after the time limit.174 This was because of the 
widely shared conviction that the administrative power should be handed over 
progressively to the local authRULW\ZLWKWKHJUDGXDOGLPLQXWLRQRIWKHRFFXS\LQJSRZHU¶V
obligations.175 
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 Grignon, supra n. 158, at 323. See also the United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Judgment of 
Wilhelm List and Others (The Hostages Trial): 
 
The term invasion implies a military operation while an occupation indicates the exercise of governmental 
authority to the exclusion of the established government. This presupposes the destruction of organized 
resistance and the establishment of an administration to preserve law and order. To the extent that the 
RFFXSDQW¶VFRQWUROLVPDLQWDLQHGDQGWKDWRIWKHFLYLOJRYHUQPHQW eliminated, the area will be said to be 
occupied. 
 
8 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Selected and prepared by the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission, (London:  HMSO, 1948-1949) at 55-56.  
172
 Final Record, supra n. 61, Vol. II-A, at 623. With respect to the temporal length of applicability of the 
proposed Civilians Convention, the United States representative emphasizHGWKDW µ[t]he Occupying Power 
should be bound by the obligations of the Convention only during such time as the institutions of the occupied 
WHUULWRU\ZHUHXQDEOHWRSURYLGHIRUWKHQHHGVRIWKHLQKDELWDQWV¶,PSOLFLWO\XQGHUO\LQJWKLVZDVWKHLGHDRI
occupying power as the trustee for the territory and population under occupation:  ibid. He then referred to 
the inadequacy of the rules governing the responsibility of the occupying power for the welfare of the local 
populations:  ibid. 
173
 See the views expressed by the Bulgarian, United Kingdom and Norwegian delegations:  Final Record, 
supra n. 61, Vol. II-A, at 624. 
174
 Ibid. (a Norwegian suggestion). 
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At the Third Meeting of Committee III, 176  the United States delegate submitted the 
amendment to Article 4 of the Stockholm Draft text.177 He distinguished between the 
obligations of the occupying power that were applicable during the period of hostilities and 
those during µWKHSHULRGRIGLVRUJDQL]DWLRQIROORZLQJRQWKHKRVWLOLWLHV¶+HSRLQWHGRXWWKDW
the nature and duration of the latter period of occupation (µpost-hostilities belligerent 
occupation¶ LQ'LQVWHLQ¶V WHUPZRXOGYDU\178 By referring to the Allied occupation of 
Germany and the American occupation of Japan, he expressly suggested the possibility of 
DµSURORQJHGPLOLWDU\RFFXSDWLRQ¶. He nonetheless contended that even in such a case, the 
governmental responsibility should be returned progressively to local authorities. The draft 
records indicate that other delegates at the Geneva Conference also contemplated the 
possibility of a protracted occupation.179 The United States¶ proposal that the obligations 
under the GCIV should be gradually handed over to local administrations was accepted by 
several delegates.180 Still, it was felt by some representative that the essence was not the 
time-OLPLWRIRQH\HDUEXWµZKLFKREOLJDWLRQV should cease (for example, those concerning 
IRRGVXSSOLHVDQGZKLFKVKRXOGEHPDLQWDLQHGIRUH[DPSOHWKRVHFRQFHUQLQJMXVWLFH¶181  
 
At the same Third Meeting of Committee III, the ICRC delegate proposed to distinguish 
two cases:  (1) the national WHUULWRU\ZKHUHWKH*&,9ZRXOGFHDVHWRDSSO\µDWWKHHQGRI
KRVWLOLWLHV¶; and (2) the occupied territory where its applicability would terminate µDWWKH
HQGRIRFFXSDWLRQ¶182 For the purpose of examining such distinction and other proposals 
(above all, the scope of the obligations that would cease to apply), the revision of Article 
4 of the Stockholm Draft was entrusted to the Drafting Committee. At the Forty-fourth 
meeting of Committee III, the revised text of Article 4 of the Working Draft was presented 
together with a separate clause (the third paragraph), which addressed specifically the 
question of the end of application of the GCIV in occupied territory. 183  This clause 
incorporated the United States¶ proposal on the time-limit of one year after the termination 
of military operations.184 Nevertheless, two influential delegates objected to this paragraph. 
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 This committee was responsible for drafting the Civilians Convention. 
177
 Final Record, Vol. II-A, at 623. 
178
 Ibid. According to the ICRC delegate, the Conference of Experts, which had been responsible for drawing 
up part of the pre-Stockholm draft text, drew on the provisions of the POW Convention which considered 
WKHHQGRIFDSWLYLW\RI32:VXSRQWKHµFHVVDWLRQRIKRVWLOLWLHV¶DVWKHEDVLVIRUascertaining the termination 
of interning civilians:  ibid., at 624. Yet, this obviously did not contemplate the possibility of administratively 
detaining civilians during the period of occupation subsequent to the end of (active) hostilities. 
179
 See the delegates of Bulgaria, United Kingdom, and Norway. The BulgariaQUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVWDWHGWKDWµ>D@
FRQVLGHUDEOHWLPHPLJKWHODSVHEHIRUHDQRFFXSDWLRQHQGHG¶ZKLOHUHIHUULQJWRVL[PRQWKVRUWZR\HDUVDWWKH
cutting period for the applicability of the GCIV:  ibid., at 624. 
180
 See the delegates of the United States, Norway, and Italy, ibid., at 623-625. 
181
 Ibid., at 624 (the suggestion by Norway). 
182
 Ibid., at 625. 
183
 Ibid., at 775. 
184
 The one-year time limit was inserted also in relation to the text of the second paragraph (governing the 




The United Kingdom, wary of any departure of the GCIV provisions from the notion of 
occupation defined in the Hague Regulations, suggested that the Stockholm Draft text be 
restored.185 Similarly, the USSR delegate proposed WKDWµDOOUHIHUHQFHWRDSURORQJDWLRQRI
WKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQVKRXOGEHRPLWWHGIURP$UWLFOH¶186 What was plausible 
was that the USSR delegate excluded any notion of prolonged occupation as a matter of 
law. He may have been concerned that the text of Article 6(3) would legitimize protracted 
occupation. Together with other delegates, in the mind of the USSR delegation, the 
instances of post-WWII Allied occupation may have been understood as of the sui generis 
kind187 that should not be repeated. Hence, the USSR may have thought that no specific 
rule tailored to such exceptional cases should be formulated. In the end, the text of Article 
4(3) of the Working Draft was adopted by Committee III.188 Subsequently, the final text of 
this paragraph, which became identical to the current text of Article 6(3) GCIV, was 
endorsed by the Plenary Assembly.189 
 
One remaining question was which provisions were to be maintained in force throughout 
WKHSHULRGRIRFFXSDWLRQDVWKHH[FHSWLRQWRWKHµRQH-\HDUUXOH¶. On this question, the Report 
of Committee III to the Plenary Assembly explained that the key to determining this 
question was to focus on those provisions UHODWLQJWRµWKHULJKW>RIWKHRFFXSLHGSRSXODWLRQ@
WREHSURWHFWHGDJDLQVWDUELWUDU\DFWV¶. On the 5HSRUW¶V suggestion, those rights ought to be 
distinguished from the provisions that had bearings more on the exercise of powers by the 
occupying power.190 
 
7.5. Evaluating the Implications of WKHµ2QH-<HDU5XOH¶XQGHUArticle 6(3) GCIV 
When inserting the µRQH-\HDUUXOH¶LQWKH text of Article 6(3) GCIV,191 there is every reason 
to believe that the drafters of the GCIV had largely in mind the then ongoing, post-WWII 
Allied occupation of Germany and Austria, 192  and the United States¶ occupation of 
                                                 
 
by the Drafting Committee. Yet, this was amended by the United Kingdom proposal. See Final Record, Vol. 
II-B, at 189 (Drafting Committee) and 386-388 (plenary). 
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 Ibid., at 775-776. See also the same point made earlier at the Third Meeting of Committee III, ibid, at 624. 
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 Ibid., at 776. 
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 6HHWKHRSLQLRQRIWKH0RQDFRGHOHJDWHµ7KHSUHVHQWRFFXSDWLRQRI*HUPDQ\ZDVDQHQWLUHO\GLIIHUHQW
FDVH¶ibid., at 624. 
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 Ibid., at 776 (by sixteen votes to eight). 
189
 Final Record, Vol. II-B, at 388 (Twenty-fourth Plenary Session). 
190
 Final Record, Vol. II-A, at 815-816. See also ibid., at 776 (the view expressed by the Rapporteur, the 
Swiss delegate); and Final Record, Vol. II-B, at 386-388 (exchange of views between the USSR delegation 
and the United Kingdom representative at twentieth-fourth plenary meeting). 
191
 Final Record, Vol. II-A, at 776. 
192
 The Allied occupation of Germany can be explained by the doctrine of debellatio:  Eyal Benvenisti, The 




Japan.193 The $OOLHG¶DYRZHGSROLF\RIµtransformative occupation¶194 in those countries 
and in other post-WWII occupied territories195 was perceived to justify longer occupation 
than the previous instances of occupation of which they were cognizant. By specifically 
pinning down the extent of the applicability of the GCIV within a defined temporal limit 
and envisaging the gradual transfer of administrative responsibility to local authorities, the 
drafters must have contemplated that those instances of the Allied occupation would (or 
should) come progressively to an end.196 Confronted with those cases of occupation that 
might potentially endure, the delegates may have seen advisable to contemplate a phased 
transfer of the responsibility for meeting the needs of the local population to the local 
authorities.197 The analyses of the draft records show that Article 6(3) GCIV is never meant 
to throttle the protections of the occupied population. Viewed in that specific historical 
context, it does not seem unreasonable198 to stipulate that in case of occupation likely to be 
protracted exceptionally, the responsibility for the wellbeing of civilians is to be 
progressively handed over to the local authorities.199  
 
On reflection, it is not unsound to suggest that in case of volatile occupation riven by short 
but intense fighting, each time a military operation is undertaken to address surge in 
fighting until it peters out, the calculation of the temporal period under Article 6(3) GCIV 
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 3LFWHW¶V&RPPHQWDU\WR*&,9at 62; Michael Bothe, Karl Joseph Partsch, and Waldemar A. Solf, New 
Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts, (The Hague:  Martinus Nijhoff, 1982) (hereinafter, Bothe/Partsch/Solf), 
at 59, para. 2.8.; and Roberts (1990), supra n. 4, at 56. As an aside, the special circumstances of the Allied 
occupation in Germany, Austria and Japan also explained the introduction oIWKHSKUDVHVµZLWKLQLWVWHUULWRU\
DQGVXEMHFWWRLWVMXULVGLFWLRQ¶XQGHU$UWLFOHRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RYHQDQWRQ&LYLODQG3ROLWLFDO5LJKWV
Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-Third Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Human Rights Commission, 6th 
session, 193rd meeting, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.193, at 13, para. 53. (1950) (reference to those three countries 
by Eleanor Roosevelt). 
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 For explorations of this concept, see Bhuta, supra n. 28DQG$GDP5REHUWV µTransformative Military 
2FFXSDWLRQ $SSO\LQJ WKH /DZV RI :DU DQG +XPDQ 5LJKWV¶ 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 $-,/ 580-622; and ,&5&¶V 
Report, Expert Meeting on Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory (2012), at 
67-72. 
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 See the Anglo-American occupation of Italy in 1943-WKH6RYLHW8QLRQ¶VRFFXSDWLRQRI1RUWKHUQ
Korea (1945-DQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶RFFXSDWLRQRI6RXWKHUQ.RUHDQ-48):  David M. Edelstein, 
Occupational Hazards ± Success and Failure in Military Occupation, (Ithaca:  Cornell Univ. Press, 2008), 
at 27, 57-86, 183 and 186-187. 
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 In the same year of the Diplomatic Conference at Geneva (1949), the Allied occupation of Italy, and the 
United States occupation of Korea (which, like Taiwan, was liberated from the Japanese colonialism), just 
came to an end. 
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 Grignon, supra n. 158, at 311. 
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 Compare Orna Ben-1DIWDOL µ´$/D5HFKHUFKHGX7HPSV3HUGX´ 5HWKLQNLQJ$UWLFOHRI WKH)RXUWK
Geneva Convention in the Light of the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
3DOHVWLQLDQ7HUULWRU\$GYLVRU\2SLQLRQ¶Israel Law Review, (2005) at 211-229; and Ben-Naftali, Gross 
and Michaeli, supra n. 39, DWFODLPLQJWKDWVXFKDQDUUDQJHPHQWRIWUDQVIHUVHHPVµDEVXUG¶ Even so, 
WKHPDQGDWRU\WHUPµVKDOO¶XQGHU$UWLFle 6(3) GCIV, used to indicate the termination of key provisions of the 
applicability of the GCIV, seems to go too far.  
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should resume from the outset.200 In other words, DFFRUGLQJWR'LQVWHLQ¶VµPHWDSKRURIDQ
DFFRUGLRQ¶ whenever a short-term military operation is undertaken, this, in tune with 
Article 6(3) GCIV, triggers the renewed praxis of the GCIV in toto.201  
 
On closer inspection, the view that prolonged occupation was unfamiliar in 1949 was only 
partially tenable. At first sight, the delegates seemed to exclude the case of decade-length 
occupation among sovereign states, other than the case of pacific occupation (occupatio 
pacifica) that was predicated on an armistice or other post-war agreements.202 However, 
several non-Western states did undergo occupation of protracted kind, as in the case of the 
United Kingdom occupation of Egypt (1882-1954).203 It may well be that precisely because 
those non-Western episodes of occupation were excluded from the application of the law 
of occupation, the delegates to the 1949 Geneva Conference (where few non-Western states 
were represented) discounted their implications as precedent. With respect to the United 
States occupation of Japan,204 Edelstein¶VVWXG\ reveals that in the very year of 1949 when 
the Geneva Conference was convened, the United States authority ruled out any prospect 
of protracted occupation.205 In view of these considerations, it seems far-fetched to argue 
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 Dinstein compares the reactivation of the GCIV and the re-operation of Article 6(3) GCIV to an accordion 
ZKLFKµPD\EHFRPSUHVVHGRQH\HDUDIWHUWKHJHQHUDOFORVHRIPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVVWUHWFKHGRXWLQIXOOLI
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 Roberts (1990), supra n. 4, at 55; Dinstein (2009), supra n. 81, at 282, para. 678.  
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The 
English History Review 597-623.  
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 Edelstein, supra n. 195, DWQRWLQJWKDWµ[b]y May 1949, leaders in Washington had further begun to 
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that when adopting the text of Article 6(3) GCIV, the framers of the GCIV envisaged the 
length of belligerent occupation to be stretched for decades rather than for years.206 It is 
likely that even though clearly cognizant of the cases of Allied post-WWII occupation, 
they may not have intended to deviate essentially from the traditional presumption that the 
occupation should remain a temporary state of affairs. It is suggested that most scholars in 
the aftermath of two World Wars endorsed the basic tenet that belligerent occupation ought 
to be an interim state of affairs.207  
 
The drafters¶ working assumption was that the legal regime of occupation be of relatively 
short duration. Unless built on that premise, it is hard to explain why the responsibility for 
the general wellbeing of the occupied population is supposed to be transferred gradually to 
the local authority. That assumption can be bolstered by the interpretation of Article 6(3) 
GCIV. Otherwise, confronted with the case of prolonged occupation where the occupying 
power refuses to hand over the responsibility to the local organ,208 the textual interpretation 
may lead to an unreasonable outcome: by virtue of the exclusionary clause contained in 
that paragraph, the local population would be denied basic needs relating to care and 
education for children, and food and medical supplies. 209  Hence, any proposal to 
accommodate decades-long form of occupation within the normative structure of the GCIV 
seems to risk running counter to the object and purpose of the GCIV.  
 
On the other hand, prima facie, nothing in the positivised text of IHL overall seems to 
exclude prolonged occupation, much less the application of the law of belligerent 
occupation to such a protracted pattern.210 The implications of the latter aspect will be 
briefly explored below.211 This author agrees that the question of the end of occupation 
should not be confounded with that of the temporal scope of application of GCIV. Indeed, 
it LVVXJJHVWHGWKDW$UWLFOH*&,9LVµQRWLQWHQGHGWRSURYLGHDFULWHULRQIRUDVVHVVLQJ
WKH«HQGRIRFFXSDWLRQEXWRQO\ WR UHJXODWH WKH HQGRU WKH H[WHQWRI WKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶V
applicability RQWKHEDVLVWKDWRFFXSDWLRQZRXOGVWLOOFRQWLQXH¶.212  
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8. Article 3(b) API and Issues of Temporariness of Occupation and Prolonged 
Occupation  
8.1. Overview 
Article 3(b) API VWLSXODWHV WKDWµthe application of the Conventions and of this Protocol 
VKDOOFHDVH«LQWKHFDVHRIRFFXSLHGWHUULWRULHVRQWKHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKHRFFXSDWLRQ¶213 
As is clear from the text, the API does not replicate the one-year limitation rule contained 
in Article 6(3) GCIV. Article 3(b) API jettisons any notion that the applicability of both 
the API and the GCIV hinges on a definite temporal limit. It sets forth the principle that 
the law of occupation enunciated in both the GCIV and the API will remain in force, so 
long as occupation endures (and until the disappearance of either the effective control on 
the ground or of its capacity to exert this by a foreign power).214 Unmistakably, under this 
provision, the temporal scope of the law of occupation is extHQGHGµEH\RQGZKDWLVODLG
GRZQLQWKH)RXUWK&RQYHQWLRQ¶.215 Accordingly, it is possible to contend that the API is 
equipped to address scenarios of prolonged occupation,216 however indefinite the length of 
occupation may be. 
 
8.2. The Travaux Préparatoires of Article 3(b) API 
The travaux préparatoires of the API reveal that its drafters were generally dissatisfied 
with the one-year rule contained in Article 6(3) GCIV.  In 1972, when the Conference of 
Government Experts (CGE) was convened, Commission IV, which was responsible for 
Part I (µGeneral Provisions¶) of the draft API, assigned a working group to prepare the text 
of Article 5 (entitled µ%HJLQQLQJDQGHQGRIDSSOLFDWLRQ¶LQWKHDEVHQFHRIDQ\FRQFUHWH
proposals by the ICRC.217 The working group, failing to muster consensus, proposed two 
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WHUULWRLUHRFFXSp¶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African Yearbook of International Law 267, at 291 and 295. 
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solutions: the first option that made references to the relevant provisions of the GCs; and 
the second one, which elaborated new rules that would even modify certain provisions of 
the Conventions, in particular the one-year limit in Article 6(3) GCIV.218  The fourth 
paragraph of the second proposed text provided, akin to the current text of Article 3(b) API, 
WKDWµ[i]n the case of occupied territories, the application of the present Protocol and the 
Conventions shall ceDVH RQ WKH WHUPLQDWLRQ RI WKH RFFXSDWLRQ¶219 The majority of the 
governmental experts in 1972 favoured the second option, including the proposal to scrap 
any time limit of the applicability of the GCs and API.220 Thereafter, the second proposal 
was incorporated into the text of Article 3(3) of the draft API text prepared by the ICRC.221 
However, unlike the subsequent text that was adopted as Article 3(b) API, the ICRC text 
notably omitted any UHIHUHQFHWRWKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQV7KLVUHIOHFWHGWKH,&5&¶Vdesire 
then that the effect of Article 6(3) GCIV should be undisturbed by the new provision of the 
API. It is reasonable to hypothesize that many experts represented at the CGE (1972), like 
the drafters of the GCIV, thought that Article 6(3) GCIV was sui generis and tailor-made 
only to the specific cases of the post-WWII Allied occupation of relatively protracted 
nature.222 The cogency of such a hypothesis can be bolstered by the fact that by the time of 
the CGE, there were already several cases of prolonged occupation that endured over 
decades. 223  Those phenomena must have outright challenged the presumption that 
occupation should be of provisional nature, and that this would come to an end 
progressively (regardless of the fact that most occupying powers failed to recognize the 
juridical status of occupation). 
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WKHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKHRFFXSDWLRQ¶,&5&Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of August 
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Subsequently at the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva (1974-77), 224  a number of 
delegates225  requested that the reference to the Geneva Conventions should be reinstated 
in the text of Article 3(3) of draft API. This led to the textual formulation now seen in 
Article 3(b) API. 226  As known, this harmonizes the temporal understanding on the 
termination of the occupation in relation to both the GCIV and the API.227  
 
At the Diplomatic Conference of 1974-77, the delegates assumed that the GCIV would 
operate in parallel to the API and continue governing the occupied territory. Accordingly, 
overall, debates did not turn to issues of occupation frequently. If they ever did, they fixated 
on two questions: (1) the meaning of a quasi-neology µDOLHQRFFXSDWLRQ¶which indicates 
one of the scenarios contemplated by Article 1(4) API, and which was understood as 
different from the traditional notion of belligerent occupation;228 and (2) the vexed question 
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During the Second World War, it was agreed that conflicts involving the expulsion of an occupant were of 
an international nature. Should a distinction be made between occupation that had lasted since the end of 
the XIXth century and that which had lasted only 4 or 5 years? Would the criteria for defining the conflict 
really be so different if the occupation had lasted a long time? The expert considered that it sufficed for the 





of JXHUULOOD ILJKWHUV¶entitlement to prisoners of war status in occupied territories under 
Article 44(3) API.  
 
8.3. Doctrinal Discourse:  the Legal Nature of Article 3(b) API and its Relationship 
with Article 6(3) GCIV 
One thorny question relating to Article 3(b) API is its relationship with, and its effect on, 
the so-FDOOHG µone-year rule¶ laid down in Article 6(3) GCIV. Some authors argue that 
$UWLFOHE$3,LVGHVLJQHGWRµDEURJDWH¶WKHµRQH-\HDU¶UXOHinsofar as concerns the states 
parties to the API. This contention is supported by the draft records. This is the case even 
WKRXJKWKH$3,DVVXPHVLWVUHODWLRQWRWKH*&,9WREHµVXSSOHPHQWDU\¶229  
 
The view that Article 3(b) API should supersede Article 6(3) GCIV can be sustained by 
assuming that the latter provision LV FRQFHLYHG RQO\ DV µD VSHFLDO DG KRF SURYLVLRQ¶,230 
which is designed, as discussed above, to deal chiefly with the cases of post-WWII Allied 
occupation.231 As a corollary, it is contended that Article 6(3) GCIV KDVEHFRPHµRXWGDWHG¶
(désuet).232 To bolster this contention, some authors argue that Article 3(b) API has come 
to express a customary rule,233 or to reinstate its pre-1949 customary rule.234 According to 
such a putative rule of general international law, the temporal scope of application of the 
law of occupation should hinge on the duration of occupation.235 This reading has an 
advantage of overcoming the question of non-applicability of the rule embodied in Article 
3(b) API to states not parties to the API. Yet, the only caveat is that both in the doctrines 
and practice, the very customary law status of Article 3(b) API has yet to be conclusively 
settled.236 In Wall, the ICJ relied on this paragraph as a positivized text rather than on any 
customary rule that might mirror Article 3(b) API. This may be read as suggesting that in 
WKH,&-¶VRSLQLRQArticle 6(3) GCIV is yet to become obsolete.237 
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contained in Article 3(b) API:  J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
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9. Brief Overview of Post-1949 Practice and Doctrines in Relation to the Provisional 
Nature of Occupation 
:LWKUHVSHFWWRWKHµFODVVLF¶GRFXPHQWVRQWKHODZVRIZDUWKLVpaper has already explained 
that the Brussels Declaration and the Hague Regulations neither expressly mention the 
provisional nature of occupation nor delineate any temporal scope of belligerent occupation. 
Nevertheless, the foregoing examinations reveal that the drafters of those classic 
instruments seemed to be more or less united in comprehending the legal regime of 
occupation as an interim state of affairs. This understanding was widely shared by most 
scholars.238 As discussed above, according to Article 6 of the Oxford Manual (1880) and 
the United States Law of War Manual (2015),239  the temporary nature of occupation is 
expressly stated as a general rule. Further, the foregoing analyses of the preparatory work 
of Article 6(3) GCIV have also suggested WKH GUDIWHUV¶ WKRXJKW based on the generally 
transitional nature of occupation.  
  
This section will succinctly ascertain how the post-1949 case-law and academic doctrines 
that have been evolving can be compared diachronically WRWKHµRULJLQDO¶DVVXPSWLRQWKDW
occupation is supposed to be temporary. The preceding examinations have already 
explained that the plethora of instances of protracted occupation that came to be observable 
by the time of the proclamation of the API seems to have had special bearings on the mind 
of the drafters of the API. This accounts for their decision to remove any temporal limit to 
recognize the ambit of occupation for so long as occupation endures. With the primary 
focus of this paper fixated on the historical prisms (the µRULJLQDO¶LQWHQWLRQRIWKHWUDGLWLRQDO
laws of war and the concurrent scholarly discourses), this section will be confined to briefly 
evaluating if and how the contemporary doctrines and practice have departed from the 
LQWHQWLRQRIWKHGUDIWHUVRIWKHµFODVVLF¶GRFXPHQWVRQWKHODZVRIZDU. 
 
Starting with the case-law, as well-known, as recently as 2004, some judges of the ICJ in 
the Wall Advisory Opinion reaffirmed the interim nature of occupation as one of the basic 
tenets of IHL.240 In 1DOHWLOLüDQG0DUWLQRYLü, when referring to Article 6 GCIV, the Trial 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) defined 
RFFXSDWLRQDVµDWUDQVLWLRQDOSHULRGIROORZLQJLQYDVLRQDQGSUHFHGLQJWKHDJUHHPHQWRQWKH
FHVVDWLRQ RI WKH KRVWLOLWLHV¶241  Accordingly, the Trial Chamber fixed the end point of 
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occupation at the conclusion of such agreement.242 Admittedly, by making the duration of 
occupation pending the termination of hostilities and the agreement to that effect, the ICTY 
7ULDO&KDPEHU¶VDSSURDFK in Naletiliü and Martinoviü may be read as recognizing longer 
occupation that may last for years.243 Nevertheless, the 1DOHWLOLü DQG0DUWLQRYLü dictum 
excludes the genre of post-hostilities occupation. This approach LVDNLQWR)HLOFKHQIHOG¶V
view discussed above.244 It is even more doubtful that 1DOHWLOLü DQG 0DUWLQRYLü can be 
taken as endorsing the post-hostilities occupation of the kind that may be protracted for 
decades. Hence, this dictum should be still understood as adhering to the traditional 
doctrine based on the general principle of the provisional nature of occupation.  
 
With regard to the state practice, as discussed above, the most recent edition of the United 
States military manual (2015)245 follows the step of its predecessor and the Oxford Manual 
in declaring occupation to be a provisional regime. Still, fine-tuning this stance, one may 
still maintain that the tenor of the United States manual does not entirely exclude a 
possibility of a long-term occupation as an exception. Further, a more far-fetched 
µLQWHUSUHWLYHVWUDWHJ\¶PD\EHPDUVKDOOHGWRjustify long-spanned occupation within a legal 
framework on occupation. There has been a proposal to finesse the meaning of the adjective 
µSURYLVLRQDO¶ RU µWHPSRUDU\¶ E\ DUJXLQJ WKDW VXFK DQ DGMHFWLYH HTXLYDOHQW WR µQRQ-
SHUPDQHQW¶LVµUHODWLYH¶DQGQRWV\QRQ\PRXVZLWKµVKRUW¶On this reading, it is said that 
long-term occupation is not contradictory to the requirement that occupation be 




Turning to the doctrines, many contemporary writers tend toward the view that while the 
legal regime of occupation is supposed to be interim, the law of occupation will continue 
to apply for so long as the factual state of occupation lasts. Confronted with the post-1949 
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occupying power. Still, the timing of such an agreement or proclamation ought to be verified on factual 
ground. 
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 Feilchenfeld, supra n. 25, at 86. 
245
 See United States Department of Defence, Law of War Manual (2015), at 735, paras 11.1, 11.4, and 11.4.2. 
246
 See Israel, HCJ 351/80 etc, Jerusalem District Electricity Co. Ltd v. Minister of Energy and Infrastructure 
et al., 35(2) PD 673, at 690; excerpted in English in (1984) 14 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 301. See 
Dinstein (2009), supra n. 81, at 119-120. Contra0HLU6KDPJDUµ/HJDOConcepts and Problems of the Israeli 
Military Government ± 7KH,QLWLDO6WDJH¶ LQ0HLU6KDPJDUHGMilitary Government in the Territories 
Administrated by Israel 1967-1980 (Jerusalem:  Alpha Press, 1982), 13- DW  FRQWHQGLQJ WKDW µWKH
exercise of the right of military administration over the territory and its inhabitants had no time-limit¶DQG
µEHFDXVHLWUHIOHFWHGDIDFWXDOVLWXDWLRQDQGSHQGLQJDQDOWHUQDWLYHSROLWLFDORUPLOLWDU\VROXWLRQWKLVV\VWHPRI
government could, from the legal point of view, continue LQGHILQLWHO\¶; emphasis added). For criticisms of 
6KDPJDU¶VYLHZVHH%HQ-Naftali, Gross and Michaeli, supra n. 39, at 597-598. 
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political reality of the plenitude of prolonged occupation, what seems to have acquired an 
air of normalcy in the scholarly arguments is the exception to the general principle that 
occupation ought to be provisional. According to the International Committee of the Red 
&URVVDQG5HG&UHVFHQW,&5&¶VReport, The Expert Meeting on Occupation and Other 
Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory,248 µWKHSDUticipants agreed that IHL did not 
VHWDQ\OLPLWVWRWKHWLPHVSDQRIDQRFFXSDWLRQ«>VR@WKDWQRWKLQJXQGHU,+/ZRXOGSUHYHQW
occupying powers from embarking on a long-term occupation and that occupation law 
would continue to provide the legal framework appOLFDEOHLQVXFKFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶249 This 
quoted sentence suggests two different points: (1) the legality of the occupying power in 
engaging in an instance of protracted occupation; and (2) the continued applicability of the 
law of occupation to such an instance. This paper does not challenge point (2). In contrast, 
what may be considered objectionable is point (1). This would entail the risk that IHL 
would be devoid of its prescriptive force in disincentivizing a state from initiating a long-
term (if not entirely irreversible) occupation. This would fundamentally change the 
axiomatic assumption that occupation ought to be (viz, essentially, or generally) 
provisional in principle, even though there may be allowance for exceptions.  
 
10. Blurring the Line between Conquest and Occupation  
It should be noted that it was even not until the 1929 Kellogg-Briand Pact (or at latest by 
the 1945 UN Charter) that conquest (with the ineluctable effect of transferring sovereignty 
over the occupied land) was outlawed. Hence, it was not unusual for the scholars even in 
the second half of the nineteenth century250 to propose that occupation was transformed 
into conquest by a post-armistice political decision (most paradigmatically, by a treaty of 
peace). The same can be said of the suggestion that in such cases, the sovereignty over 
occupied territory would have to be ceded to the occupying authority.251 
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 ICRC, 7KH,&5&¶V5HSRUWRIWKHExpert Meeting on Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of 
Foreign Territory, (Geneva:  ICRC, 2012), at 13 et al. 
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occupé, cette acquisition du pouvoir souverain agit rétroactivement sur les actes faits et les lois promulguées 
SDUOXLSHQGDQWO
RFFXSDWLRQ¶µWKHWUHDW\RISHDFHFRQIHUVRQWKHRFFXSDQWWKHVRYHUHLJQW\RYHUWKHRFFXSLHG
territory, this acquisition of the sovereign power becomes effective retroactively on the acts done and the law 
SURPXOJDWHGE\WKHODWWHUGXULQJWKHRFFXSDWLRQ¶WUDQVODWLRQE\WKHSUHVHQWDXWKRU/RHQLQJ, supra n. 29, at 
633. In this respect, he referred to Halleck, supra n. 27, at 815, para. 4. See also ibid., at 635-636. According 
to Loening, Bluntschli rejected any acquisition of the territory under belligerent occupation, summarizing 
WKUHHRI%OXQWFKOL¶VSULQFLSOHVRQEHOOLJHUHQWRFFXSDWLRQDVIROORZVDIWHUWKHRFFXSDWLRQWKHRFFXS\LQJ
power does not have to tolerate the continuing exercise of the political authority in the occupied territory; (2) 
the occupying power possesses the right to exercise on its part the sovereign power as much as it is necessary 
for the security of the army and for the purpose of maintaining public order; and (3) the occupying power 
does not have the right to treat the occupied territory as a part definitively acquired for its state and consider 
its inhabitants as its subjects:  Loening, ibid., at 628. 
251
 In the aftermath of two World Wars, Julius Stone questioned the continued viability of sovereignty as the 
foundational idea of the law of belligerent occupation. This was because the sovereign-occupant distinction 
with regard to the transfer or non-transfer of sovereignty was considered reflective of political, economic and 
social conditions, and ideologies of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, in his view, the sense of (political) 





It is set against such backdrop that one can grasp why the Lieber Code (1863) seems to 
blur the line between occupation and conquest. Article 33 of the Lieber Code alludes to the 
SRVVLELOLW\RIDQQH[LQJWHUULWRU\µafter a fair and complete conquest of the hostile country 
RUGLVWULFW¶. The porous nature of the boundaries between occupation and conquest is also 
reflected in the second sentence of Article 1 of the Lieber Code. This sentence states that 
µ[m]artial Law is the immediate and direct effect and consequence of occupation or 
conquest¶ $FFRUGLQJ WR *LODGL E\ HPSOR\LQJ WKH WHUPV µoccupation¶ and µconquest¶ 
almost interchangeably in substance, Lieber considered the provisional nature of 
RFFXSDWLRQ µQRW SUHSDUDWRU\ WR WKH SRVVLEOH UHYHUVLRQ RI WKH WHUULWRU\ WR WKH RULJLQDO
VRYHUHLJQ >EXW@ >U@DWKHU«WR PDNLQJ FRQTXHVW FRPSOHWH¶, if the victor preferred that 
option.252 It is even VXJJHVWHGWKDW/LHEHUHQGRUVHGWKHµXQOLPLWHG¶QDWXUHRIthe right of 
conquest.253  
 
It has been argued that both belligerent occupation and pacific occupation (occupatio 
pacifica) were deemed µHVVHQWLDOO\SURYLVLRQDO¶. Still, there seemed to be greater tolerance 
for prolonging the temporal span of the latter genre of occupation, which µmay last for a 
YHU\ORQJWLPH¶254 Generally, the scope of pacific occupation was determined for a definite 
period by the relevant treaty. Yet, in some cases, treaties failed to fix any term and the 
occupation lasted for decades. The United States occupation of Cuba pursuant to the 
Spanish-American Treaty of 1898 and the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the 
territories that had been formerly administered by the Ottoman Empire,) in tune with the 
Treaty of Berlin of 1878 were the cases in point.255 In those instances, pacific occupation 
took on indefinite and more protracted nature. There was even barely concealed intention 
to transfer sovereignty over the territory, 256  which came to bear much of epistemic 
similarity to the case of colonialism.  
   
                                                 
 
was conceptually tethered to the doctrine of sovereignty:  Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International 
Conflict (London:  Stevens & Sons, 1954), at 727. See also Feilchenfeld, supra n. 25, at 24, para. 100 
(explaining that even the most egregious kind of the occupying power such as the Nazi, and the total warfare, 
µGRQRWREYLDWHWKHDQDO\WLFDOGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQVRYHUHLJQVDQGPHUHRFFXSDQWV¶EHFDXVHRILWVSUDJPDWLF
LPSRUWDQFHRIGLIIHUHQWLDWLQJEHWZHHQµSURYLVLRQDO¶QDWXUHRIRFFXSDWLRQDQGµILQDODQQH[DWLRQ¶EDVHGRQWKH
transfer of sovereignty). 
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 ,Q KLV YLHZ WKLV PDUNHG D FRQWUDVW WR WKH IRUPHU WKDW µLV JHQHUDOO\ SUHFDULRXV DQG DV D UXOH RI
comparatively shorWGXUDWLRQ«>ZKLFK@FRPHVWRDQHQGZLWKWKHHQGRIKRVWLOLWLHV¶:  Jones, supra n. 38, at 
159. For the pacific occupation, he referred to the case of occupation of Germany for fifteen years prescribed 
by the Treaty of Versailles:  ibid. 
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 Ibid., at 159. Compare DOVRWKH%ULWLVKµRFFXSDWLRQ¶RI,UDT-32) and Palestine (1919-1948) under 
WKH /HDJXH RI 1DWLRQV¶ PDQGDWH DQG WKH WUHDW\-based United States occupation of Haiti (1915-34) and 








11. Conclusion: the Paradox of NormalizDWLRQRI3URORQJHG2FFXSDWLRQLQWKH,+/¶V
Argumentative Structure  
This paper has delved into the drafting records of the documents of both classic laws of 
war and of modern IHL with a view to discerning WKHµRULJLQDO¶LQWHQWLRQRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
on the temporal length of belligerent occupation. Those examinations have unveiled how 
the conceptualization of the law of belligerent occupation was contingent upon particular 
social and historical contexts and minds of nineteenth-century Europe. The legal regime of 
occupation was contemplated as an interim regulatory framework purported to maintain 
order and stability of the occupied territory until there was a political decision on the 
disposal of that territory.257 7KH ODZ RI RFFXSDWLRQ SODFHG D µSURFHGXUDO¶ DQG WHPSRUDO
UHVWULFWLRQRQWKHRFFXSLHUH[HUFLVLQJWKHGLVSODFHGVRYHUHLJQ¶VSRZHUDOEHLWZLWKRXWWLWOH
including the power to dispose of the territory at its will. 258  
 
It can be submitted that the modern law of belligerent occupation proves to be paradoxical, 
insofar as the temporal length of occupation is concerned. The paradox is that modern 
academic discourse on IHL, having duly DFKLHYHG LWV µFRQFHSWXDO GHFRORQLzDWLRQ¶ E\
ditching the colonial/non-FRORQLDOGLYLVLRQKDVFRPHWRJUDSSOHZLWKWKHµOHJDOVWDVLV¶RI a 
considerably spun-out pattern of administering foreign territories259  within the explanatory 
framework on the law of occupation.260 Confronted with the post-1949 political reality of 
several instances of prolonged occupation,261 both the practice and scholarly discourse 
WROHUDWHDQGHYHQµQRUPDOLzH¶DSKHQRPHQRQRIFRQVLGHUDEO\SURWUDFWHGRFFXSDWLRQ (that 
come to resemble colonialism), instead of advocating a unified standard that condemns it 
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 See Giladi (2012), supra n. 21, at 86 (discussing in detail the basic understandings of Vattel and other 
classic writers as to the importance of the notion of occupation in securing order and stability). It was 
conceived as an aversion to disorder and chaos of the kind seen in the Napoleonic War. This understanding 
was shared, notwithstanding a plethora of colonial and imperialist wars that were often fought with harshness, 
or at times even brutally with scant regard for the laws of war. 
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 During the period of occupation, the exercise of such a right by the occupying power was suspended. The 
gradual acceptance of such thinking by the second half of the nineteenth century can be explained by the 
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Orford (ed.), supra n. 7, 57-DW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FRPPHQWLQJRQ+XPH¶VXQGHUO\LQJWKRXJKWWKDWµ>G@LVRUGHUDULVHVIURP
the intolerable impossibility of certainty in questions of knowledge and justice, an impossibility whose 
intolerability seems soluble by WKHLPSRVLWLRQRIDXWKRULW\¶ 
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 East Timor (between 1975-2000); Western Sahara; Palestine by Israel and surrounding Arab states 
between 1948-1967; the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the Golan Height by Israel since 
1967; and by Israel since 1967); Northern Cyprus by Turkey; Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia, and arguably 
Tibet. 
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 Dinstein (2009), supra n. 81, at 120, para. 279. It does not matter that in almost all such instances (save 
for the notable exception of Israel), there has been an outright refusal to acknowledge such control as 
occupation. 
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 At present, the SDUDGLJPRIµFRORQLDO¶ domination through the system of occupation now takes another 
SDUDGR[LFDOO\ µXQLYHUVDO¶ PDQWOH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as contrary to the general assumption of the law of occupation.262 Such µQRUPDOLzDWLRQ¶RU
µPDLQVWUHDPLQJ¶RIthe regime of belligerent occupation that was previously understood as 
analogous to the emergency state of affairs (and hence more as exceptional matter) in the 
traditional laws of war may be a familiar feature of the argumentative structure of 
international law. It remains to be seen if this should be comprehended as a necessary 
adjustment due to the defiance of the reality against the hitherto valid assumption of the 
law (namely, the provisional nature of occupation),263 or as an apologetic slide into the 
geopolitical reality (that is, inclination toward protracted occupation).264  
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 As discussed, within the pre-1949 framework of traditional laws of war, the dominant understanding was 
that belligerent occupation had to be essentially provisional. 
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 Compare Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michaelie, supra n. 39, at 596 (discussing how the reality has challenged 
the underlying assumption behind the text of Article 6(3) GCIV). 
264 7KLVPD\EHFRQVLGHUHGWRGLYXOJHWKHODWHQWSHUPXWDWLRQLQWKHFRQFHSWXDOSUHPLVHWKHODZ¶s prescriptive 
force (in demanding interim or temporary nature of occupation) have been redefined at the quest for an 
apologetic endorsement of factual reality (several instances of prolonged occupation). See .RVNHQQLHPL¶V
analysis of how the argumentative structure of international law oscillates between apology and utopia:  
Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia ± The Structure of International Legal Argument, (Helsinki:  
)LQQLVK/DZ\HUV¶3XEOLVKLQJ idem µ3ROLWLFVRI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶ 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) 1 European Journal of 
International Law 4. 
